

REPORT
Of the Experts of the Center for Strategic Research
to the Committee of Civic Initiatives

CHANGES IN POLITICAL SENTIMENTS OF RUSSIAN CITIZENS
AFTER THE PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS

Moscow
October 23, 2012

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Introduction

Political sentiments of Russian society undergo important and swift changes which may impact future political processes.

Two trends may be identified as regards external manifestations of such changes: weakening of the opposition movement in Moscow and declining of trust in the authorities across the country. However, the actual processes are apparently more complex and interrelated and demand detailed studies.

In connection with the emerging trend toward weaker participation in protest actions many experts suggest that protest movement in big cities is waning. However, this hypothesis is not the only one possible and is, perhaps, least likely: the movement has an obvious potential for restructuring by segment according to specific ideas and preferences. Separate columns with their own slogans and sometimes even speakers tend to appear at rallies. It is quite probable that many mass-scale protest segments of the Moscow society are not represented at rallies due to lack of relevant leaders and civic movements. If this supposition is true, the outcome of such restructuring - that is only starting - may be the delineation of ideological positions of protesters and the renewed strengthening of the movement based on clearer political foundations. Spontaneously there appear political competition and political actors in the protest movement, potentially able to engage in dialogue amongst themselves and with the authorities.

Ironically, parallel to a decline in the number of protesters in Moscow and a propensity to protest outside Moscow, a decrease in trust in the bodies of power and in President V.Putin resumed. The current pace at which that trust is declining and distrust growing is unprecedented for all the period since early 2000^s. “The romance between the public and the authorities”, as Kirill Rogov has put it, is over. The gap between the two ratings is quickly closing and if the present trend prevails, they may equalize in 2013.

The reasons for such controversial developments are far from being obvious, especially since Moscow does not feature an electoral “weight” sufficient for shaping a nation-wide trend. Politically, it is important which of the ideological centers shaping up in Moscow would influence the strongest political attitudes in Russian regions. Maybe, several such attitudes will form. The competing Soviet-socialist vs. modernization ideologies are of particular importance. Experts diverge as to their potential. Some fear a return to socialist demands, while others believe that modernization ideology has taken such deep roots in the society that it will become the leading political idea. This issue requires an in-depth study, since the future of the country hinges upon it.

In the context of rapidly strengthening demand for renewed leadership at the national, regional and local levels, the whole issue of new political leaders and their

electoral potential comes to the fore. This issue was studied in sufficient depth in the previous political report by the CSR. Yet, due to rapid changes in the political situation, the issue is revisited in this study.

In September-October 2012, upon request from the Committee of Civic Initiatives the CSR did a pilot survey to seek answers to these emerging questions. Along with standard qualitative and quantitative survey techniques used in social studies, this survey for the first time employed some approaches based on psychological techniques of studying socio-political attitudes. Because of the experimental nature of psychological component of that study, it was conceived as pilot and a fairly small-scale one. However, the significance and potential explanatory power of its results are well beyond the boundaries of a pilot exercise. All that provided reasons for generating a new political report.

The report contains 6 chapters and Annexes.

Chapter 1 presents key hypotheses and methodologies used in the study.

Chapter 2 considers key changes in political attitudes of the public identified on the basis of representative surveys and focus-groups.

Chapter 3 analyzes the way the Russian population and its various segments view Russian authorities. The analysis is primarily based on results from sociological and psychological focus-groups.

Chapter 4 presents the study of opinions expressed by participants of protest actions in Moscow based on their in-depth interviews.

Chapter 5 presents the analysis of public perception of the potential federal-level political leaders (A.Kudrin, D.Rogozin, I.Shuvalov) based on focus-groups and representative surveys. The study continues our research of political leadership in Russia launched in spring of 2012¹.

Chapter 6 looks into the outcomes of regional and local elections held on October 14, 2012 and offers their valuation based on sociological and psychological surveys.

In Conclusion we present some key inferences and speculate how our study results may impact assessments of medium- to long-term trends in Russia's political development.

Annex 1 presents brief descriptions of psychological techniques used for the study. Annex 2 contains tables with key results of elections held on October 14, 2012.

¹See "Russian State and Society in Political Crisis. Moscow, CSR, May 2012.

Chapter 1. Hypotheses and Survey Methodology

1.1 Key Hypotheses

Our first hypothesis states that the weakening of Moscow-based protests is a temporary phenomenon caused by restructuring of the movement. The current protests are to a large extent dominated not by the most numerous groups but by the best organized ones, including radical leftists and nationalists. This may change with time. Future protests will be increasingly driven by the most groups enjoying most numerous supporters. Until recently, such groups were not sufficiently structured and they need more time to get better organized. When it happens, it will change the shape of protests drastically. We assume that political groups pursuing the modernization agenda will gain the strongest influence, at least in Moscow.

Our second hypothesis states that the decline of trust in the authorities is caused by fundamental reasons, actually characterizing a transition from the outgoing ideology of Putin's stability to a different ideological framework. The direction and the driving forces behind these changes are to be clarified on the basis of sociological evidence. There are some preliminary indications that the modernization agenda may gain a fairly significant place in the balance of political sentiments outside Moscow (perhaps with some adjustments in its substance, as compared to Moscow).

Some additional hypotheses were developed in the course of the study, as substantiated by empirical evidence.

This study was conceived as a relatively small-scale pilot. The pilot format was chosen since the nature of changes in society is still controversial thus requiring some preliminary interpretation; moreover, many of the techniques employed – psychological in particular - were used for the first time and their results (including the validity of such techniques) only lend to hypothetical prediction. However, the significance and potential explanatory power of these results reach well beyond the boundaries of a pilot exercise.

All the surveys were done between September 22 and October 8, 2012.

1.2 Description of the Methodology

1. Sociological focus-groups

All in all, 12 focus-groups were conducted.

Focus-groups were aimed at identifying political preferences of various population segments in Moscow and in Russian regions. In the course of the exercise a special emphasis was put on the reasons for changes in the level of trust in the authorities. These changes are presented for three separate periods: a decline during

2009-2011, an increase between December 2011 and March 2012 and a decline from March 2012 to September 2012.

Two of those focus-groups were held in Moscow with representatives of the Moscow middle class, two more – in Moscow with participants outside the middle class (one with pensioners and another with middle-aged individuals), six – in two regional capitals (broken down into three age categories), and two more in single enterprise centered towns.

This part of the study compared public perceptions of the three political leaders who at a time were named informally as to be the probable future candidates for the position of the Prime-Minister: A.Kudrin, D.Rogozin and I.Shuvalov.

Focus-group 1: Moscow, middle class

Focus-group 2: Moscow, middle class

Focus-group 3: Moscow, pensioners, no university degree

Focus-group 4: Moscow, middle-aged, no university degree

Focus-group 5: Samara, middle-aged, no university degree

Focus-group 6: Samara, young people, no university degree

Focus-group 7: Samara, pensioners, no university degree

Focus-group 8: Gus-Khrustalny, middle-aged, no university degree

Focus-group 9: Novokuybyshevsk, middle-aged, no university degree

Focus-group 10: Vladimir, pensioners, no university degree

Focus-group 11: Vladimir, middle-aged, no university degree

Focus-group 12: Vladimir, young people, no university degree.

1. Psychological focus-groups

Unlike sociological focus-groups, psychological focus-groups aimed to identify deep motivations of respondents via a broad range of projective and other psychological techniques. This study was peculiar in that some psychological techniques described in detail in the respective section were used for social instead of individual diagnostics. In line with study objectives, these techniques were modified, as described in the relevant section of this report.

Seven focus-groups were conducted within the psychological part of this study. The goal was to gain a deeper understanding of citizens' political motivations and their demands to the authorities (reaching to their unconscious level).

Specifically, the following focus-groups were conducted.

Focus-group 1: Moscow, middle class

Focus-group 2: Moscow, middle-aged, no university degree

Focus-group 3: Vladimir, middle-aged, no university degree

Focus-group 4: Verbovsky (Murom district), middle-aged, no university degree

Focus-group 5: A village in the Murom district, middle-aged, no university degree

Focus-group 6: Moscow, labor migrants from Daghestan residing in Moscow for 5 to 10 years and having active families and relatives in Daghestan

Focus-group 7: Moscow, teenagers of 12-13, pupils of general education secondary schools.

2. In-depth interviews with participants of political rallies

This technique aimed to identify protest groups that have no political representation in the existing political structures, detect the processes of restructuring in the protest movement and possible directions of such restructuring.

Twenty in-depth interviews were conducted in the course of the study involving participants of the latest rallies, past rallies as well as their sympathizers.

3. A pilot quantitative survey

The survey was performed in the same cities where focus-groups were conducted. The objective of that effort was to substantiate, as much as possible, the outcomes from focus-groups with quantitative survey data. Rural settlements where focus-groups were conducted were not surveyed. Altogether 1,000 respondents were surveyed (5 cities with 200 respondents each).

Chapter 2. Key Changes in Political Attitudes of the Russian Population between March and October, 2012

2.1. Trust rating of V.Putin and its evolution

2.1.1. Reasons for the decline of V.Putin's trust rating before the State Duma elections of 2011

The downward trend in the incumbent trust rating of the President of the RF and in other indicators of trust in the authorities was initially marked in 2009, but started to be seen as steady and irreversible in 2011 only, since its high probability was indicated in the first CSR political report. During 2011 the trend was recorded by all the Russian sociological organizations, as studied in detail in previous CSR political reports².

Between 2009 and 2012 only one significant deviation from that trend was observed during the presidential election campaign of December 2011 - March 2012, when V.Putin's trust rating and electoral rating went up temporarily to their levels


²“Russian State and Society in Political Crisis. Moscow, CSR, May 2012.

roughly corresponding to those of early 2011. The reasons of such rebound were analyzed in the previous CSR report. We concluded that the impact of the election campaign would be short-lived, and in the future the decline of trust in the authorities would continue. In the period between March and September 2012 that prediction was fully confirmed (see Fig.1 below).

Figure 1.V.Putin’s trust rating

Do you trust V.Putin or do you not? (card, one answer)

% of all surveyed



Prior to February 24, 2008, the question was formulated in the following way: “Do you trust President Vladimir Putin or do you not?” Between March 8 and April 27, 2008: “Do you trust Vladimir Putin or do you not?” Since May 18, 2008 to March 13, 2011: “Do you trust the Head of the Government Vladimir Putin or do you not?”

The key ideas expressed by focus-group participants regarding the above graph in September-October 2012 were as follows. According to the respondents, no significant results have been achieved over the many years of V.Putin’s rule, including the provisional period of D.Medvedev’s rule. Only words and promises were endlessly repeated. Therefore respondents considered the continued decline of the trust rating to be natural.

The majority of focus-group participants explained the decline in ratings by the fact that during the period no action has been taken in the country to improve the situation, to address most burning and relevant problems. Those are unresolved socio-economic issues primarily concentrated within a certain pool: unsatisfactory state of education

and healthcare, personal security and the rule of law, quality and accessibility of infrastructure (especially in the housing and utilities sector), corruption, lack of growth and development in the majority of industries, etc. Of particular concern is the so called “soullessness” in society and indifference to the needs and problems of the population demonstrated by the authorities.

- *Our political system is unable to put itself in order. Failures in healthcare, medical care, education are the primary reasons why a young person with no money cannot achieve any kind of growth. Industry is nonexistent, there are no jobs, and everything is bad everywhere, of course (Novokuybyshevsk, male, 43 y.o., secondary education).*

2.1.2. Reasons for V.Putin’ rating recovery in the period between elections to the State Duma in December 2011 and presidential elections in March 2012

In the period between elections to the State Duma in December 2011 and presidential elections in March 2011 the trust rating picked up 10 per cent.

When speaking about the reasons for that phenomenon, focus-groups participants mentioned non-alternative elections, “secured” political environment, “no one to vote for”, “candidates have been handpicked” etc., as well the fact that people voted with very mixed feelings. This fact was analyzed in depth in our previous report on the basis of the cognitive dissonance theory: people voted for V.Putin while valuating negatively his work and seeing no alternative candidates (even being apprehensive about such alternatives).

Respondents talked not only about the absence of other candidates but also about some stability which would be maintained in case V.Putin were elected as President. Reluctance to see changes for the worse, choice of “the lesser evil” resulted in a somewhat higher rating in that period and then, as the cognitive dissonance effect inevitably grew weaker – in a drop of rating to below the previous floor reached in December 2011.

- *I was afraid to see changes for the worse. I cannot say that Putin is so wonderful, nobody saw anything much achieved over the years of his rule, and we are fed up with all those endless promises. But it is even less clear what may happen further down the road. (Vladimir, female, 51 y.o., no university degree).*

The majority of focus-group participants noted a formidable propaganda campaign unleashed by V.Putin as the second main reason for his rating to grow. Causes of such short-lived but real impact of that campaign call for a special study. Respondents could

only record this fact but not explain it. This hardly comes as a surprise since respondents are no experts in advertising communication theories.

In terms of advertising theories, the increased volume of TV broadcasts with participation of V.Putin was obvious while volumes of broadcasting devoted to other candidates were lagging behind significantly (in advertising the volume of broadcasting is gauged by GRP, a factor characterizing the total number of advertising contacts with the audience).

However, increased volume of broadcasting has limits of its effectiveness, - the so called “plateau”: once the plateau is reached, ratings stop growing irrespective of broadcasting volume. With excessive increase in broadcasting volume and duration, the advertising impact “wears out” and ratings tend to decline. It would appear that V.Putin’s campaign was well-planned in terms of broadcasting duration and intensity, and its effectiveness reached its peak on the day of the elections.

Along with broadcasting volume there is another important indicator – the broadcasting contacts ratio that defines the audience sensitivity to broadcasted messages. That ratio may be either positive or negative.

During V.Putin’s campaign of January-March 2012 it was undoubtedly positive, but, according to the laws of advertising, even that resource has its limits.

Does V.Putin have any possibility to further improve his ratings by increasing the above indicators? That issue has not been addressed in our study, due to limited resources. It can be assumed, however, that the possibility to improve his rating by quantitative increases in the GRP has reached its limits. Some proxy indications are found in statements repeatedly made by focus-groups participants who keep suggesting that only words and no action may be seen in Putin’s activity. An extremely negative reception of current PR-actions with Putin’s participation will also be discussed below.

- *The election campaign was on, and there were a lot of nice promises, just like always. I think we have a group of people who tend to believe any campaign pledges. That was a period when there was this outright campaigning (Moscow, female, 40 y.o., university degree).*
- *Because the election campaign was run very actively, it missed no single person in our country, literally. The President’s face was everywhere, some pledges, some speeches by the “United Russia” everywhere... Perhaps that was exactly what produced certain impact, so that people probably believed once again to put their hopes [with him]. (Vladimir, male, 43 y.o., no university degree).*

Whether V.Putin would be able to bolster (if temporarily) his contact value ratio through his political rhetoric and acting skills once again remains to some extent an open question. Yet there are reasons to believe that this resource – if still available - is almost exhausted. Political scientists have long noticed that political actors, unlike movie and theater actors cannot drastically change their line of character. Therefore, no matter how V.Putin were to further develop his campaign (and there were signs of its energizing in late September – early October 2012), he will inevitably be showing his “spectators” the same “movie” time and again, despite the fact that signs of its erosion are obvious. At any rate, the authors of this report believe that even if some impact is achieved, it will be short-lived and marginal.

2.1.3. Decline of V.Putin’s rating after the elections

Since presidential elections to October 2012, V.Putin’s trust rating has been steadily declining (from 55% in March 2012 to 44% during second half of September 2012).

The pilot quantitative survey and focus-groups conducted under this study helped to identify some new trends that fuel the growth of distrust in the authorities. Such high level of distrust along with other psychological syndromes suggests that tensions between the public and the authorities aggravate.

Focus-group participants explain the decline in the ratings as following: V.Putin failed to meet the trust placed in him, no real positive reforms have been launched, economic situation continues to deteriorate, and inflation persists. One other important cause was that the elections were not fair.

These statements are confirmed by the outcomes of both our quantitative survey and sociological focus-groups.

Table 1.

| | |
|--|----|
| During the presidential election Putin received quite a few votes, but now, according to surveys, trust in him is waning. Why do you think this is happening? <i>Open-ended question, % of those who responded (57% of those surveyed responded)</i> | |
| No real action, positive developments in the country | 33 |
| Putin did not meet the trust placed in him, disappointed | 27 |
| Living standards decline, the situation deteriorates | 19 |
| Elections were not fair | 13 |
| Our people are dumb (a herd) | 5 |
| I do not think the trust is waning | 3 |
| Do you feel disillusioned by the policy pursued by the authorities?(% of those surveyed) | |
| Definitely yes | 45 |

| | |
|------------------|----|
| Rather yes | 21 |
| Rather no | 14 |
| Definitely no | 15 |
| Difficult to say | 5 |

These data agree well with the data by other centers of public opinion research, Levada-Center in particular³.

It should be noted that the majority of focus-groups participants are of the opinion that not only election results but also the outcomes of surveys (trust ratings and other indicators) are falsified. This is a serious indication of a spillover of distrust reaching beyond the authorities to a broader pool of social actors which are believed to be mere appendages of the former.

- *Maybe they do this on purpose, difficult to say. Ratings here are often unpredictable and I would not trust them, generally (Moscow, male, 37 y.o.).*
- *First, elections were fraudulent. And people no longer trust him. Nothing is being done in the country (Samara, female, 37 y.o., secondary education).*

2.2. Key changes in the political consciousness of Russians between March and October 2012

In its previous reports the CSR explained in detail that one of the key research functions of focus-groups is their predictive capacity. It is manifested in the fact that some opinions that were never voiced previously start to appear simultaneously across the country in settlements separated by hundreds and thousands of kilometers.

The study data make it possible to state that mass conscience of the Russian population has undergone marked changes over the brief period since spring 2012, and the pace of such changes approximately corresponds to the pace at which Putin's ratings are declining. The key changes are as follows:

1. Respondents in almost all focus-groups talked spontaneously about a possibility and sometimes even desirability of a revolution. Its prospects are discussed not so much emotionally, but rationally as the only conscious alternative remaining in case the authorities refuse to go through renewal voluntarily. Changing the leadership through elections against the desire of the authorities is not considered a realistic option by the respondents. This can be regarded as a practically unanimous opinion.

Apprehensions and fears regarding the revolution with its possible excesses are expressed significantly less often than in spring. In a sense, one can speak about the

³<http://www.levada.ru/26-09-2012/sentyabrskie-reitingi-odobreniya-i-doveria-polozhenia-del-v-strane-zapomnivshiesya-soby>

law of political preservation here: the lower the possibility for a legitimate change of regime by means of elections or voluntary renewal appears, the more legitimate violent (or quasi-violent such as mass-scale rallies or civil disobedience) ways of changing those in power become in the eyes of the people. All this means that exerting pressure on the authorities is now considered legitimate and even necessary by many respondents.

At first glance such results tend to contradict the data from quantitative surveys by Russian public opinion research centers. These surveys suggest that actual readiness of the population to participate in protests has diminished significantly since early 2011. But similar indications of political demobilization were revealed in the psychological part of our study (see more details in paragraph 3.4.2).

However, closer examination demonstrates that we are observing somewhat different phenomena:

- a) personal participation in the protest actions is perceived as dangerous or pointless to some extent since there are no adequate ideas and speakers;
- b) various formats of active resistance to the authorities ranging from civil disobedience to the likes of the “orange revolution” are considered legitimate.

Authors of this report interpret this shift in public consciousness as transitory: it may result in the final breakdown of the so called “Putin’s stability” ideology. As visualized by the masses, the legitimacy of protest movement is increasing significantly. However, most respondents are not prepared to protest personally but begin to approve protests from other members of society and thus express their growing sympathy to such protests.

For some time, measures of political reaction described in detail in the previous CSR report may stall political activism but not shifts in mass-scale political attitudes of the population. In such context society becomes more sensitive to triggers of mass protests: the protest pressure on the authorities becomes more legitimate. This facilitates the development of mass protests if, for example, the socio-economic situation deteriorates due to the second wave of economic crisis.

- *Resolving the problems peacefully is not our way. I would hate to see it, but anything is possible, because the latest crackdown on the Bolotnaya Square proved that the only way to “settle issues” with our authorities is by force (Moscow, female, 36 y/o/, university degree)*
- *I absolutely do not rule out revolution. And the real decline in Putin’s rating is happening not in the country at large, but among the elite that has its own agenda – this may affect the situation, for in Russia all the revolutions were*

always triggered “from somewhere at the top” (Moscow, 34 y.o., university degree).

2. It should be noted that focus-groups sometimes expressed a different opinion which was supported by the minority and was criticized by other participants as unrealistic. It was about a voluntary renewal of the authorities when – hypothetically - V.Putin would relinquish his power voluntarily before the end of his term, just like B.Yeltzin did in 1999, and suggest a real successor able to rule the country effectively. Despite the fact that V.Putin significantly discredited this option with D.Medvedev, such wishes are still to be heard in focus-groups.

- *New leaders must emerge against the background of this discontent. They are given no chance now, but this will have to happen. Those in power must understand that unless new leaders appear, the existing ones can do nothing either, there is no trust in any of them any longer (Samara, female, 46 y.o., no university degree).*

3. Unfortunately, as respondents themselves suggested, the above scenario is made much less realistic since a growing distrust in all political leaders – both in power and in the opposition - is observed. Respondents find it hard to name promising leaders.

- *Exactly since we see neither leaders, nor programs people do not understand what to struggle for or against. All this is very vague. There is no cause for us which would excuse stepping out into the streets, therefore we are at a loss, [there is] no one to trust. (Moscow, female, 31, university degree).*

4. All focus-groups unanimously expressed negative attitudes to PR-activity of V.Putin. Respondents constantly stressed that instead of addressing serious affairs of state he continued to deal with minor issues of no major importance for the people (e.g. new daylight saving time reform, excessive discussions on the Pussy Riot case in the media, etc.)

Especially negative attitudes are generated by such PR acts as his discovery of the diotae and his flight with the cranes. Just recently such acts were taken good-naturedly as a rule and were putting respondents in a playful mood. However, in the fall of 2012 such acts generated the following typical mass response: instead of resolving important state problems, the president “is engaged in God knows what”. Issues in healthcare, education, industry and agriculture as well as many other problems remain unresolved.

V.Putin's flight with the cranes

- *A laughing stock, of course. Come on, imagine a person who is flying with those cranes when the guy is the President and must attend to other things? (Vladimir, male, 26 y.o., no university degree).*
- *Perhaps, the rating is plunging because of - let me put it this way - some awkward moves in his PR-campaign. For instance, when he was leading a flock of cranes it was very funny indeed. A lot of people considered this lunacy and maybe some lost their confidence in Putin (Moscow, female, 49 y.o., university degree).*

The media coverage of the "Pussy Riot" hooliganism

- *Then some events, maybe those girls, I mean those from the "Pussy Riot" who were jumping in a church, may have contributed, too. Ok, you watch the news, monitor it and I guess a little too much of attention is given to this [event]. All this is exaggerated on the front pages, in all newscasts as if there is nothing else to discuss in this country (Moscow, female, 33 y.o., university degree).*

Description of the current state of affairs in the country

- *Well, they have been disorganizing this country for the last ten years. They have demolished everything, - education, science, the armed forces. Only energy sources are left. Everything is permeated by corruption. This disorganization of the country is purposeful. They want to bring it to the beggar's state. And this hurts a lot. Now, the scariest thing is that spirituality is being destroyed. It is the spirituality that bonds the people together, and yet it is being eliminated (male, 36 y.o., university degree).*

5. Respondents take a very negative attitude to tightening the regulations on rallies, laws on slander, NGOs' activities, etc. that tend to impede the activity of legal opposition. Many participants of focus-groups took the passing of laws on rallies and slander very negatively as another step toward eliminating the freedom of speech and the right to express the will of the citizens in the country. It is important to note that not only residents of Moscow are pretty well aware of those laws, but also people residing in Russian regions including respondents from the so called "back country".

- *Those new bills do not play into his hands. In particular, it is already forbidden to gather in numbers in excess of 50 anywhere in a square, for that is considered an unauthorized rally. People are put to those cars with flashing*

lights and brought away. The same goes for this law on slander (Novokuybyshevsk, female, 42, secondary education).

6. Attitudes toward D.Medvedev have changed drastically; in the spring these were of fairly amiable irony. Today we can hardly consider any negative or rancorous attitude toward him. Something different is observed: the figure of D.Medvedev, Chairman of the Government of the Russian Federation is not mentioned at all during discussions in focus-groups. No questions specifically related to D.Medvedev were asked, while his name was mentioned extremely rarely and in a rather humiliating context in spontaneous discussions: on several occasions an idea was expressed that Putin with his comeback did one useful thing, - namely, rid the people of Medvedev.

- *Medvedev in fact means four years of power vacuum. He was sitting out and lying low. Neither any decisions nor actions were taken. He is good for nothing (Moscow, female, 38, no university degree).*

7. All focus-groups expressed unanimous and unreserved negative attitudes to the “United Russia”. Earlier (i.e., in spring) they were not so clear and unambiguous.

- *The “United Russia” has grown totally irrelevant as a [political] party. Previously at least somebody would vote for it, but now it brings nothing but irritation. During those elections in December the “United Russia” party totally discredited itself with its unfair play (Vladimir, male, 55, no university degree).*

8. Not only in Moscow but also in Russian regions respondents in all focus-groups would say almost nothing about V.Putin’s previous achievements, despite the fact that these were recalled rather often back in spring. In fact, such achievements seem to be forgotten by now, even though the standards of living of massive groups of population have improved significantly over the 12 years of Putin’s rule. Respondents believe that Putin has once again to prove his “utility” for the people, literally “from scratch”. The majority of focus-group participants came up with very negative characteristics of the current activity of V.Putin: he promises a lot, but implements nothing.

- *We all were expecting something after the elections, but I would say he failed people’s trust. We were expecting something from him, but things haven’t binged an inch. Prices are climbing as well as utility charges, and people were hoping to see changes for the better but nothing of the kind happened (Gus-Khrustalny, male, 49, no university degree).*

Data from Moscow middle class focus-groups suggest that the attitudes toward V.Putin among the members of that strata have changed from negative to hostile and alienated.

- *Somehow I was especially outraged at the way the election campaign was run in December, January and February. It seemed to me that those “chess games” with the people are so cynical. [People] voted for anyone but Putin (Moscow, female, 38 y.o., university degree).*
- *It is already sickening to watch Putin. Previously he was more or less tolerated - although without love, of course -, and now he is simply unbearable. He takes people for complete idiots and is not even trying to conceal it (Moscow, female, 33 y.o., university degree).*

10. Of special note is the attitude that society has to the Russian Orthodox Church (ROC). This issue was beyond the scope of this study. However, when discussing reasons that are causing decline of V.Putin ratings, a topic emerged spontaneously among other answers: his rating is affected by numerous scandalous situations with the clergy, including the Patriarch’s watch, “Pussy Riot” trial with obvious interference of the ROC and the federal authorities. These and similar cases undermined the image of both the ROC (of its top officials to be precise) and the authorities.


The growing distrust in the ROC leadership clearly manifested itself in projective (psychological) focus-groups. Respondents compared the clergy with foxes (mentioned 12 times), jackals (9), curs (5), hyenas (3), crows (4) wolves (3) crocodiles (1) and patients of a mental institution (1). There were statements that the authorities were trying to turn the ROC into a modern version of the Communist Party committee in vain attempts to fill the ideological vacuum.

These data suggest that the authorities and the ROC itself have chosen a wrong approach to defining their role in society. This was already highlighted in the previous CSR report: attitudes to the ROC as a most important institution of society go hand in hand with a clear idea of its acceptable social boundaries. An overwhelming majority of Russians subscribe to the opinion that the Church must stay away from politics and ***its role must be primarily that of strengthening the moral foundations of society.*** Attempts of the ROC to directly influence political attitudes of Russians are not only inefficient, but also counterproductive, as the study suggests.

- *The Church is not considered as something clean and fair - perhaps in the light of the latest developments. It is “a state within a state”, the like of the authorities.*
- *In the Soviet times there was the Communist Party. And now there are no Party committees, and we see attempts to install the Church into this vacant spot. A clergyman instead of a Party committee, in each hospital there is a house of prayer. This is how the authorities attempt to fill the ideological vacuum. But we do not need this. After all, we are a secular state.*


The above attitudes to the ROC were found in psychological focus-groups. Some 68% of respondents recorded positive attitudes to the church, 32% - negative attitudes. In terms of its attitude to the ROC, the mass conscience appears to be split into two unequal groups with antagonistic views. According to all surveys the majority of respondents continue to trust the ROC; however, a sizeable segment has appeared in the mass conscience that sticks to the opposite view. Potentially it may reach about one third of the adult population. According to the above quotes from focus-groups and answers by the respondents, that segment could have formed in reaction to “governmentalization” of the Church and its turning into “a new version of the Communist Party committee”.

Figure 2. Positive attitudes to the Church



- *Dove – brings peace, calms down, gives hope.*
- *Sun – gives warmth to everyone.*
- *Lion – is revered by all, a source of advice.*

Figure 3. Negative attitudes to the Church



- *Fox – cunning and slippery just like our clergy, especially Gundyayev [the Patriarch]*
- *Jackal – dull and gray, just like our Church today.*
- *The Church is [like] wolves, for they capitalize on their traditions to scoop everything.*
- *The Church is [like] crows, they dive at everything unattended and are eager to pick plums.*

2.3. The situation in the country as viewed by the Russian “middle class”

Although the share of middle class in Moscow markedly exceeds that in Russian regions, it is safe to discuss the Russian middle class in general on the basis of the Moscow focus groups following the similarity of the place its members hold in the society and of their political views.

As for the attitudes of the middle class to the current political situation in the country compared to the rest of the population, there seem to be no principal differences in its assessments; the caveat being that two factors influence the statements made by representatives of that class:

- high level of education bringing the opinions of this segment closer to expert opinions;
- its higher income and human capital which makes the option of “leaving this country” more or less viable.

Unlike other population segments, the majority of middle class representatives offered highly qualified assessments of the state of affairs in the country, including its

economic situation, its domestic and foreign policy. Clearly, the level of education and expert awareness of this class is significantly higher than that of most news anchors (at least of the way they are represented on major TV channels). While the rest of the population simply expresses distrust in what the anchors are saying, many middle class members are capable to expertly refute statements made by the official media substantiating their position with evidence. One may state with confidence that the middle class has gone completely out of control of the ‘official’ television all across Russia.

It should be emphasized that middle class representatives were extremely pessimistic in their outlook of the situation in the country and its future.

- *Everything in Russia has been disorganized. It is bad that fundamental components of society – education, army, healthcare – do not feel their significance, nor are they protected; they do not consider themselves as the backbone of the state. Therefore they have no incentives to work well and take pride in their country (Moscow, female, 39 y.o., university degree).*

Many representatives of the middle class - especially in Moscow – insisted on considering emigration, not necessarily in the near future, but at least as a remote prospect. Because of that they actively encourage their children to learn foreign languages and buy residential housing abroad noting that the price tag for real estate there is much lower than in Russia. Some respondents have grown-up children who have graduated from Western universities and “secured their position” in respective countries. These people are seriously considering moving in with their children.

- *Many of the people I know think more and more of emigration destinations; we also consider various options since there are many things here we are not happy about. There is no point in waiting for anything, it is impossible to change mindsets quickly, and the authorities are in complete stagnation (Moscow, male, 41 y.o., university degree).*

In addition to the above topics, there was another one actively voiced by middle class focus-groups representatives, virtually never mentioned by other focus-groups. Many middle class respondents talked about a broadening rift within elites which could trigger a new wave of protests, public outrage and other unpredictable consequences.

- *Most probably the elite will split, new centers of influence will emerge trying to fill the ensuing vacuum in public opinion. On the other hand, pro-Putin elite will remain the most powerful and will be using increasingly tough methods to influence people’s consciousness, suppress opposition and establish a “new set*


of values” which has been in the making for several years already (Moscow, male, 37 y.o., university degree).

2.4. An Increasingly Prominent Role of the Internet

The study has demonstrated that the Internet is playing an increasing role in people’s lives, not only as a means of communication (social media, forums, etc.) but as the main source of news and political information. Such people prefer to read or watch their news on the web instead of watching the TV.

The Internet penetration rate in the country has been monitored by the FOM [Public Opinion Foundation] since early 2000s through weekly nation-wide surveys. Internet users are those respondents who answered “in the past 24 hours”, “in the past week”, “in the past month” when asked “Did you have personal experience using the Internet? If yes, when was the last time when you personally used the Internet?”. As the figure below suggests, the monthly Internet audience went up from 8% in the spring of 2003 to 46% in the spring of 2011⁴.

Figure 4. Internet penetration rate, % of people aged 18 and older



According to the latest FOM data, the share of active audience (individuals surfing the web at least once every 24 hours) currently stands at 39% (45.1 million people). The annual increase of users surfing the web at least once a month is 14%, and 23% for the 24-hour audience⁵.

⁴<http://bd.fom.ru/pdf/Internet%20v%20Rossii%20vol%2033%20vesna%202011%20short.pdf>

⁵<http://runet.fom.ru/Proniknovenie-interneta/10598>

Surveys of participants from protest rallies (see below) show the respondents stressing that the Internet and digital media today are among the key information instruments of the protest movement. The highest levels of activity are observed in forums, Internet, social media.

- *Capabilities of the protest movement have been augmented dramatically, - of course, among other things, thanks to the Internet. First of all, these capabilities are broader because the Web is available. After all, we have the media that can give the floor to the opposition. I am referring to the “Echo of Moscow, “Radio Liberty”, “Novaya Gazeta”, and there are forums, social media – everything is there (Moscow, male, 41, university degree).*

Chapter 3. Results from Psychological Focus-Groups

3.1. Study Techniques

Psychological part of the survey consisted of two sections: 7 psychological focus-groups totaling 70 persons and 2 quantitative surveys, one of which polled 180 persons and the other – 1000 persons.

All the data from the survey based on samples of varying scope are presented as percentage values, to reduce their results to comparable foundation.

The following techniques were used for the purpose of the survey:

1. The questionnaire aimed to identify the authorities’ goals. All in all, 250 persons were polled (including one quantitative survey of 180 persons, plus participants of all the psychological focus-groups numbering 70 persons).

Each respondent was asked to select one or more of five optional statements on the goals of Russian authorities that would agree best with the opinion of that respondent. That part of the technique is rather sociological, since it is not based on any psychological theory.

2. The technique of assessing the characteristics of current authorities. All in all, 230 persons were polled (one quantitative survey of 180 persons, plus the participants of 5 psychological focus-groups (50 persons), to the exclusion of the Daghestani migrants and teenagers).

That technique is aimed to identify positive and negative characteristics of authorities at the cognitive level, while the technique of semantic differential (see below) detects the emotional assessment of authorities. Combining both techniques makes it possible to identify contradictions (or absence of those) in the perception of authorities at both the cognitive and emotional levels.

The technique of assessing cognitive characteristics of authorities consists of a table of 88 positions containing 44 positive and 44 negative characteristics of the current authorities. The response presupposed two options, i.e. presence vs. absence of a given quality (on a binary scale). Composing the lists of such characteristics was preceded by preliminary work with respondents and experts.

The respondents were proposed to note those characteristics that they believed to be most significant. Next these results were quantified. For that purpose positions were analyzed indicated by the majority of respondents.

3. The technique of semantic differential. All in all 250 persons were polled (including one quantitative survey of 180 persons, plus 70 persons - participants of all the psychological focus-groups).

Semantic differential is a quantitative technique aimed to rate values and meanings using bi-polar scales set by pairs of antonyms, the scale of 3 to 7 points positioned between these extremes. The technique of semantic differential, developed initially by C.Osgood⁶ for the purpose of psychological studies, was actively used further on for sociological polling⁷ and proved to be an effective instrument in many problems of sociology and political technologies⁸.

This study used a 5-point scale from (+2) to (-2). Zero point served as the middle of the scale.

Subjects were presented a list of scales characterizing the current Russian authorities (e.g., sympathetic-indifferent) and they had to indicate the figure on the scale that corresponded to their respective perception. Similarly ideal profiles were formed to present the public vision of ideal authorities and their leaders.

All in all, 20 scales were formed. They were developed by authors of the survey on the basis of preliminary discussions with respondents and experts. When finally selecting the scales, their developers tried to evade political, social or other clichés that could predefine response thus invalidating it.

4. The technique of assessing the social syndrome of learned helplessness in Russian population. The total number of persons polled was 1240 (1180 participants

⁶Osgood S.E., The nature and measurement of meaning, *Psychological Bulletin*, 49 (1952), 197—237.

⁷E.Noel, *Mass Polling*, M.: Progress, 1978

⁸Baranova T.S., *Psychosemantic Techniques in Sociology*, *Sociology*: 4M. 1994. № 3-4. Pp. 55-64; ↑
Petrenko V.F., Mitina O.A., *Psychosemantic Analysis of the Dynamics of Social Consciousness (on the Basis of Political Mentality)*. Smolensk, Smolensk State Univ.Publ., 1997; ↑
Miller D. Y., Barker D. C. and Carman C. J., *Mapping the Genome of American Political Subcultures: A Proposed Methodology and Pilot Study*, *The Journal of Federalism* 2006 36(2), 303—315.

from two quantitative surveys and 60 participants from 6 psychological focus-groups, to the exclusion of teenagers).

Learned helplessness is a disturbance of motivation resulting from uncontrolled situation that the subject suffered, its outcome being independent of exerted efforts («it's no use, no matter how hard you try»). The syndrome of learned helplessness at individual level was first described by the US psychologists Martin Seligman and Stephen Maier (Seligman, Maier, 1967). Seligman indicated three sources of forming such helplessness:

1) unfavorable personal experiences, i.e. lack of a possibility to control the events of one's own life; the negative experience acquired in one situation is then projected to other situations in which the possibility of control does actually exist, i.e. high level of motivation to evade failures is formed;

2) experience of observing helpless persons (e.g., TV features showing helpless victims);

3) lack of independence under authoritarian management.

A relative stability of learned helplessness was confirmed by F.Fincham with co-authors (Fincham et al., 1989) and M.Burnsand M.Seligman (Burns, Seligman, 1989), the latter authors believing that such helplessness stays with a person for life.

Learned helplessness is characterized by a manifested deficit in three areas — motivational, cognitive and emotional. The motivation deficit is manifested as inability to act intervening in a situation, the cognitive one — as inability to learn those skills that may appear effective in an actual situation, the emotional — as a depressed state originating from the feeling of futility of one's actions.

The hypothesis of social syndrome of learned helplessness among the Russian population was formulated by the present authors on the basis of their social observations during last decade. Possibly, the appearance and development of that syndrome has rather deep historical roots. However, in the authors' opinion, it was noticeably augmented by political transformations that occurred during the years of V.Putin's rule (in particular, by the actual cancellation of elections at every level). To study the level of manifestation of that syndrome, a questionnaire was designed. It focused on detecting the social depressive syndrome related to inability to influence the course of events in the country at any level.

The techniques described in items 1–4 were used in both their quantitative and qualitative modes, i.e. their questionnaires were not only distributed to respondents for filling, but also discussed in psychological focus-groups. The techniques to follow (5–6) were basically used as qualitative for psychological focus-groups, though their end results were also quantified next.

5. The projective drawing test. 70 persons polled.

During psychological focus-groups their subjects were offered a projective drawing test to diagnose the unconscious, hence non-verbalized perception of actual

aspects of interaction between the current authorities and the public and their vision of ideal authorities in their interaction with the public. Test subjects were asked to produce two drawings. The first had to show the current authorities and the public as two circles, inscribing which animals the public and the authorities are associated with.

The second drawing had to show respondent's vision of the public and the authorities and their interaction in an ideal case. That drawing also had to have an inscription of animals that the public and the authorities are associated with.

6. M.Luscher's color classification. 70 persons polled.

When interpreting respondents' drawings, not only the images of the «public» and the «authorities» and their mutual positions on the sheet were considered, but also the colors used to present that pair and its interaction for both the present and the ideal future. To that end each respondent was given a set of red, blue, green and yellow felt tip markers ('basic' colors according to Luscher), plus black and grey (non-basic colors).

The two core concepts of M.Luscher's theoretical construct were used for analysis, namely the «structure» and «function» of color. The «structure» of color is interpreted as its stable meaning common for all the public. The «function» of color is interpreted as its individual meaning specific for each separate person. Using the color classification by Luscher, possible combinations of color in each of the drawings were reviewed.

3.2. Population Ideas on the Current Russian Authorities and its Activity Objectives

3.2.1. Objectives of the Russian authorities

When asked about the goal of the current Russian authorities, 29% of respondents stated that the authorities were incapable of explaining their goals to the public, 26% of those polled stated that the authorities' goal consisted in personal enrichment, 22% more said that the authorities did not want to explain their goals to the public, 15% believe that the authorities wanted to build a strong authoritarian state, and 12% thought that the authorities wanted to build a strong democratic state with liberal values (see Table2). If one sums the first four positions, it appears that 88% of respondents believe the authorities to pursue their own interests this or that way, while only 12% believe that they are working in the interest of all the public via building a democratic state. Therefore the first position (rating 29%) is of particular interest. The authorities are incapable to explain their goals to the public because they either fail to understand the course they are driving the country along, or are afraid to disclose it to the public, or are generally incapable of stating their position clearly and defending it in public.

Table 2. Goals of the Russian authorities

| Authorities goals | Percentage |
|---|-------------------|
| The authorities cannot explain their goals to the public | 29% |
| The goal of the authorities consists in personal enrichment | 26% |
| The authorities do not want to explain their goals to the public | 22% |
| The authorities want to build a strong authoritarian state | 15% |
| The authorities want to build a strong democratic state with liberal values | 12% |

- *Current authorities want to build a democracy, but do not understand something, and keep failing.*
- *They want to be sure of tomorrow, but only for themselves. They need to provide for their own children, why anyone would care for the public then.*

3.2.2. Positive and negative characteristics of the current authorities

Assessing positive and negative characteristics of Russian authorities the following data was obtained.

Merits of the current Russian authorities noted by more than half of the respondents are their:

- efforts to solve the demographic problem – childbirth allowances, ‘maternity capital’, attempts to stimulate birth rate in the country (57%);
- eloquence(54%);
- fighting terrorism (53%);
- developing high-tech sector (51%).

Among the worst manifestations of Russian authorities, noted also by more than half of those polled, are:

- continuous growth of utilities prices (94%).
- in effective solution of housing problems (81%);
- disintegration of industry and agriculture (75%);
- endless discussions of the need to fight corruption against the lack of actual actions (70%);
- attempts to remain in power by any means (67%);
- clan politics and cronyism (66%);
- introduction of the Unified State Examination for the secondary school graduates (64%);
- incapability to bring law and order to the country (62%);
- poor control of execution discipline in public administration (62%);
- pursuit of personal gains by the officials (58%);
- reduction of state budgeted seats in universities (58%);
- disregard of laws of their own country (57%);
- ineffective social policy (53%);

- stultifying of the public (52%);
- alienation from the public (51%).

Note that while 88 different characteristics (44 positive and 44 negative) were mentioned in the list, 87 of them were ticked off at least once. *Meanwhile the statement «the authorities know well what to do next» was never ticked by any of those polled.* In other words, the population believes that the authorities have a dim idea of further development, and that reflects quite seriously on the social mood, producing the social depressive syndrome, to be demonstrated below.

The full list of characteristics of Russian authorities may be seen in the Diagram at the end of this Section. Note also that positive characteristics averaged a 22% rating, while negative ones averaged 48%. Apparently the latter prevail strongly.

The front positions in the «rating of the worst characteristics» belong to utilities price growth, disintegration of industry and agriculture, inadequate solution of the housing problem. Going by the data obtained one may suggest that the public are afraid of worsening of the situation in that and other areas, in contrast to the public mood during the Gorbachev and Yeltsin eras, when the people were ready for drastic changes in their lives in hope of rapid development and sharp improvement of life quality after the era of stagnation. Then people were more confident in their ability to cope with uncertainty.

However, by 2012 that self-assertion was lost. Now the people want changes for the better so much, but are frightened to loose what they already have. Such a chance is there («what can we do if Khodorkovsky with all his money could do nothing»).

The pillars that any democratic society resides on: the rule of law, elections, freedom of enterprise, and private property were almost never mentioned during focus-groups. The rule of law was partially mentioned but only in the context of the need for the authorities to observe the laws they adopted themselves. Moreover, the concepts of freedom of enterprise and private property produce irritation.

The public demands stronger state control. Meanwhile the people fail to see that stronger state control would require expanding the bureaucratic apparatus, which is in complete disagreement with the hatred towards state executives.


3.2.3. *The emotional perception of the authorities*

The technique of semantic differential made it possible to reveal emotional perception of the current Russian authorities. Regrettably, extremely negative characteristics prevail in such perception: indifferent, dishonest, unjust, irresponsible and dangerous. The latter characteristic is further strengthened by the public idea that the authorities are strong, active, sagacious and full of volition. The latter could be

perceived as positive in a different combination of characteristics. However this particular combination calls for a different interpretation. The authorities are perceived as quite an unsafe subject, so that such positive qualities as strength, intelligence, will, activity in combination with expressed dishonesty and unfairness assume a strong negative hue, as confirmed by projective drawing tests (see below).

Figure 5 presents the results of emotional assessment of current authorities by the population.

Figure 5. Emotional assessment of the authorities by the population



- *It is getting worse and worse for the public day by day, whatever decisions, whichever decrees – they are screwing the nuts tighter, bureaucrats do what they please, and what are we left to do – suffer?*
- *Indifference to the public, plus empty promises – these are the two causes for Putin’s rating to drop. There were a lot of promises in the beginning, yes, and what now? Promises again, but that is irresponsible!*

3.2.4. Innermost level perception of interaction between the authorities and the public as expressed by projective drawing tests

Projective drawing tests mostly associate the current authorities with predators (88% of respondents) or other aggressive creatures or entities, such as the boar, the black goat, the tank (an extra 8% of respondents to total 96% of aggressive images). Another optional perception, in obvious minority (4%), compares the authorities with such «futile» entities as soap bubbles or bats, probably symbolizing the futility of authorities.

According to the same psychological tests one may say that the people mostly feel themselves victims («the authorities are wolves – the people are the sheep», «the authorities are eagles – the people are sparrows»), and the authorities (indifferent, irresponsible, unjust, and dishonest while being active, intelligent, strong-willed and ferocious) may annihilate them at any moment.

Thus the overwhelming majority of respondents perceive the authorities as serious and dangerous (a predator, a tank). Then the people step out as either the sheep, or scapegoats, or some other weak creatures, these images underscoring their subservient position (see Table 3).

Table 3. Associative images of the public and the current authorities

| Authorities associated with the | Public associated with the | Percentage |
|--|--------------------------------------|-------------------|
| Wolf | Sheep, hares | 30% |
| Lion | Sheep, hares, dogs | 18% |
| Tiger | Sheep, monkeys, jackals | 12% |
| Eagle | Sparrows, hummingbirds, doves, crows | 10% |
| Bear | Dogs, sheep | 6% |
| Constrictor | Donkey, monkeys, macaques | 6% |
| Crocodile | Sheep | 4% |
| Boar | Dogs, ants | 4% |
| Kind dragon | Horse | 2% |
| Black goat | Sheep led by a black goat | 2% |
| Tank | Globe | 2% |
| Bat | Sheep | 2% |
| Soap bubble | Scapegoats | 2% |

- *Poor sheep not shepherded by anybody.*
- *We are all scapegoats.*
- *The public are the donkeys that the tiger authorities exploit as they please.*

Note that the drawings completely lack any link between the public and the authorities. The test in yielded drawings that were separate in scribed images

positioned at opposing parts of the sheets which lacked any interlinks (they never touched or crossed and had no connecting elements such as lines or arrows).

3.2.5. Innermost level perception of interaction between the authorities and the public as expressed by M.Lüscher Color Test

The technique of M.Lüscher Color Test confirms the dichotomy that surfaced in the drawing tests, conditionally to be called «wolves and sheep» hereunder.

As a rule, the authorities are depicted in black or red and are placed above the public on the sheet. The public is most often shown in blue or green (68%) or red (32%) in rarer cases.

Showing the powers in black expresses the attitude to the mas as an authority, however a menacing authority causing negativism (the color combination of «black/red»), a situation that one strains to avoid (the color combination «black/blue»), or a readiness to suffer constraints, agree with the existing conditions (the color combination «black/green»). Depicting the powers in red expresses its aspiration for achievements, for authority, for dominance, as well as aggression.

Considering the colors depicting the public, one may follow M.Luscher to conclude that the blue expresses passivity, dependence on external influences; the green means defense, a tendency to retain valuables gained, the red means activity, aggression, and resistance to external pressure. The color pair «red/blue» expresses lability, variability of feelings and moods, inability to find internal comfort.

The «red/green» pair expresses the red straining to achievements, to authority, to domination while the green exerts some restraining effect. According to Luscher's classification the green is a «conservator» type avoiding any novelties. It holds to traditions and is respectable, does nothing indecorous or unexpected from the point of view of common sense. Green only fights back when something touches it personally and remains indifferent otherwise.

However we recall that the public is also shown in red, remaining in its role of the victim. That, according to Luscher, is the reverse side of the color. Red for the public in the «red/red» pair demonstrates the impossibility of «red behavior», giving birth to the image of a «miserable sufferer» protecting him/herself from frustration. Somebody else may drive posh cars and throw money to the wind, while the miserable sufferer stands on the curb with a feeling of helplessness. The only thing left is to resent the whole world and feel sorry for oneself. Things coming to the fore are irritability, weakness, quick tiredness. One's behavior is controlled by despair; that is why actions by such persons are often reckless, as confirmed by multiple cases of such rashness, often randomly targeted. What is left of the former red is an attempt to draw attention to oneself in a different way: «Let them see how bad I feel, how I suffer».


The full list of color combinations symbolizing the authorities and the public according to the survey is presented in Table 4.

Table 4. Color combinations describing the public and the current authorities

| Authorities | Public | Meaning of the color combination | Percentage |
|--------------------|---------------|---|-------------------|
| Red | Red | Red is the lead color for authorities. Red for the public indicates the impossibility of dominant behavior, giving birth to the image of a «miserable sufferer» protecting him/herself from frustration. | 32% |
| Black | Blue | In authorities this is a threatening power, resulting in a tendency for passive escape from the situation and in an attempt to stay away from everything. | 28% |
| Black | Green | In authorities this is a threatening power, resulting in the need to suffer limitations and even humiliation to conform to the existing conditions. | 16% |
| Red | Blue | Red is the lead color for authorities. Blue devoid of red is left without its actual living source of satisfaction; it is a passive conformist that never grumbles. | 12% |
| Red | Green | Red is in the lead, seeking for authority and domination while green is offering certain resistance. Note that green only fights back when something touches it personally and remains indifferent otherwise. | 8% |
| Black | Red | In authorities this is a threatening power, resulting in a negativism and certain aggression in the red, though more in fantasy than in reality. Meanwhile there exists a possibility of impulsive and recklessly aggressive actions. | 4% |

Fig.6 presents the image of the public and the current authorities.

Figure 6. Image of the public and the current authorities



3.3. The Russian Public Ideas of the Ideal Authorities

To bring out the public ideas of the ideal authorities and the ideal «authorities-public» interaction we used:

- the technique of semantic differential; respondents were requested to position the ideal political authorities headed by their leader along the scales they used to assess the current authorities;
- projective drawing tests with participants from focus-groups instructed as following: «Imagine the public and the authorities to be animals in the woods. Draw them as circles and inscribe which animal you associate with the public and which – with the authorities. Try to draw the ideal authorities the way you imagine them»;
- Luscher's color classification to analyze the combination of colors used by the respondents to draw ideal authorities.

3.3.1. Characteristics of the Ideal Authorities

When suggesting to respondents to select qualities of the ideal authorities, it was apparent that the general estimate would be strongly biased towards positive qualities. Meanwhile the degree of «positive-ness» of various characteristics appeared to be

different. Characteristics were identified that were more/less valid for respondents in their image of the ideal authorities. According to the survey, the most significant characteristics include: justice (105 points), intelligence (104 points), patriotism (98 points). Among the less important are safety (55 points), freedom granting (53 points), and kindness (46 points).

According to the data yielded by semantic differential, an ideal leader should feature the following characteristics (see Table 5):

Table 5. The idea of ideal authorities

| Characteristic | Scale weight |
|-----------------------|---------------------|
| Justice | 105 |
| Intelligence | 104 |
| Patriotism | 98 |
| Responsibility | 97 |
| Activity | 93 |
| Trustworthiness | 93 |
| Competence | 92 |
| Honesty | 91 |
| Consistency | 91 |
| Strong will | 88 |
| Strength | 86 |
| Safety | 55 |
| Freedom granting | 53 |
| Kindness | 46 |

The data obtained shows first of all that, provided the authorities are just, intelligent and patriotic, other qualities would add themselves, in the opinion of the respondents. In other words, in public vision these are the key qualities that the Russian authorities should feature, benchmarking all their activities against those.

At the same time such authorities should be safe, freedom granting and kind much less, since these features are associated with connivance and permissiveness. Then being safe from the authorities is far outweighed by the threat of various forms of asocial behavior on the part of individual persons, and the public understands that such social diseases may spread as epidemics.

Note that such qualities as strong will and strength also shifted down the scale. Apparently, that reflects the public idea that will and strength should only be used as a means to provide justness, patriotism and love towards the people (though that characteristic was not included in the survey). It is also important that will and strength should be applied intelligently, not in a «bear's indiscriminate style».

3.3.2. *Ideas About the Ideal Authorities*

Focus-group participants got an instruction similar to that described in Paragraph 2 of the technical part of the Chapter: «Imagine the public and the authorities to be animals in the woods. Draw them as circles and inscribe which animal you associate with the public and which – with the authorities. But this time draw the ideal authorities the way you imagine them».

Note the following aspects in the results obtained:

- The public wants protection, warmth, support from the authorities, since it is seen as chicken and hen, trees that may not survive without the sun, a housemaid that thinks about the public, as explained by the respondent, an epical hero, etc., which parallels the roles of the authorities and the public with those of parent/child;
- The public is ready to serve the authorities. The respective images are presented by the dog that will serve if fed well; laborious ants following a prescribed conflict-free hierarchy; hoofed animals that one may use for tilling soil; a cow to be milked. The important thing is to cater for the public, feed it, keep it in comfort. The public would appreciate it and work it out, as needed;
- In case the authorities provide good care for the public, the public is ready to remain «silent, since there is nothing to complain about», «walking in a herd and obeying the shepherd»;
- In 80% of cases the intuitively selected colors denoting the public and the authorities are such that the «color» of the authorities is leading with respect to the «color» of the public;
- Comments to drawings often include words on «unity» and one may naturally suggest: beside the need in care by the authorities, one of the principal needs for the public is its need for integration, for order (ants and bees).

These data agree well with the results yielded by the technique of semantic differential used to identify the qualities of the ideal leader.

It is important that in most cases the drawings describing ideal relations between the public and the authorities show some link between them, while descriptions of such actual relations never had that link expressed.

Drawings showing ideal relations have the link between the public and the authorities expressed by 42% of respondents this or that way. Six per cent among them have touching circles (the lion and the dog, the owl and the dove, the kind dragon and the bear), 4% have crossing circles (the hen and the chicken, the whale and the fish), another 4% have the circle of the «public» embracing the circle of the «authorities» (the owl and the dove, the lion and the ants). Next, 28% of respondents connected the public and the authorities with arrows. Among them 10% connected the public and the authorities with two-way arrows, 4% had one-way arrows aiming from the public to

the authorities (the whale and the fish, the lion and the ox), and 14% had one-way arrows aiming from the authorities to the public.

Note that even when drawing an ideal image of the public and the authorities, more than half of the respondents (58%) had no idea of connection between the public and the authorities, while another 14% saw that link to lead one way from the authorities to the public.

Table 6. Images of the ideal authorities yielded by the projective drawing tests

| Association for the authorities | Association for the public | Percentage |
|--|---------------------------------------|-------------------|
| Lion (the king of beasts) | Bees, ants, dogs, oxen, bulls, horses | 38% |
| Eagle | Doves, parrots | 16% |
| Dog | Bulls, mice, ants | 12% |
| Intelligent owl | Swans, geese | 10% |
| Sun | Bear, trees, planet | 6% |
| Whale | Fishes (not carnivorous) | 4% |
| Broody hen | Chicken | 2% |
| Human being | Cow | 2% |
| Kind dragon | Bear | 2% |
| Shrack | Donkey | 2% |
| Squirrel | Bear | 2% |
| Wolf | Elephant | 2% |
| Housemaid | Epical hero | 2% |

- *Ants are so laborious, they have a prescribed hierarchy, no conflicts, and everything is done for the sake of one's anthill.*
- *If the master feeds his dog well, the dog serves faithfully.*
- *The authorities are a housemaid; she thinks of the people, solves problems for them. And the public is the epic hero.*

3.3.3 Interpreting drawing tests according to Luscher color classification

Dealing with that technique as applied to ideal public/authorities relations encountered certain difficulties. Many respondents found it hard to find an association with this or that color. Apparently, this part of the study needs more technical understanding and interpretation.

However, processing the drawings in accordance with M.Luscher's color classification made it possible to obtain the following hypothetical data on the meaning of predominant color combinations (see Table 7).

- The predominant combination of «blue-blue» (32%) indicates harmony and calm relations between the public and the authorities.
- The combination of «green-green» (20%) may be interpreted as readiness by the public to delegate its responsibilities to the authorities.
- The combination of «red-red» was described above in detail. It may be interpreted in the current context as inability of the public to manifest its dominance with respect to the authorities.

Table 7. Color combinations presenting the ideal authorities in their interaction with the public

| Authorities, color | Public, color | Meaning of the color combination | Percentage |
|---------------------------|----------------------|---|-------------------|
| Blue | Blue | Quietude, contentment, feeling of unity and harmony | 32% |
| Green | Green | «Green» authorities reach for high status, «green» public is not ready to take responsibility and delegates it to the authorities | 20% |
| Red | Red | Red for the public demonstrates its incapability to manifest dominance with respect to the authorities | 10% |
| Yellow | Yellow | Roaming, straining for changes, dissatisfaction with the present in combination with aspirations for the future | 8% |
| Red | Green | Red is in the lead, seeking for authority and domination while green is offering certain resistance. Note that green only fights back when something touches it personally and remains indifferent otherwise. | 6% |
| Red | Blue | Red is in the lead. Blue devoid of red is left without its activity, its «living strength» according to Bergson | 4% |
| Red | Yellow | Red is in the lead, it targets yellow towards actual achievements | 4% |
| Blue | Green | Blue is in the lead, it tries to overcome the stubbornness of green that does not want to go anywhere | 4% |
| Blue | Red | Red is in the lead. Blue devoid of red is left without its activity, its «living strength» | 4% |
| Green | Red | Red is in the lead, seeking for authority and domination while green | 4% |

| | | | |
|------|--------|---|----|
| | | is offering certain resistance | |
| Blue | Yellow | Blue and yellow are directed differently, so that pair expresses lability, changeability of feelings and moods. Blue is notably deep, while yellow is perfunctory | 4% |

Fig. 7 shows the image of the ideal authorities and their relations with the public.

Figure 7. The ideal authorities and their relations with the public



3.4. Current Psychological State of the Russian Public

3.4.1. Disbelief in the authorities and the future of the country

In the course of conducting psychological focus-groups, their participants repeatedly manifested their lack of confidence regarding the authorities and the future of the country.

Below are excerpts from focus-group discussions:

- *I see no future for this country.*

- *We are living day by day, people are afraid of the future, it seems to me. In other words, it is frightening to keep on living, there is uncertainty. And uncertainty is always frightening.*

Such statements confirm the presence of the social syndrome of learned helplessness described above among the population.

The syndrome of learned helplessness presupposes dependence. A helpless person needs protection; he/she needs someone strong to shelter him/her from menaces that come from life. In case of public, those may be the authorities, it may be God, it may be alcoholization, it may be the hope that people live well somewhere where we don't dwell.

God, as presented by the modern ROC, does not help to solve the problem. The authorities, regretfully, also fail to solve it.

One of the solutions is alcoholization:

- *Look, now, all of them are scattered all over, see, they all keep drinking away, no limit, nothing.*
- *Everybody keeps drinking, generally, young ones in particular. Women drink on a par with men. Get out into the street some night, have a look.*

Finally, there is some hope that moving to another country will help solve the problem:

- *People are simply driven out of the country.*
- *They produced such living conditions that people start to think about renting their flats out in Russia and using the money thus saved to live somewhere abroad where life is cheaper.*

Thus focus-groups revealed an expressed social depression from which the people find no constructive way out. Destructive escapes are alcoholization and fantasies of departure, the latter being feasible for only a few representatives of the middle class.

3.4.2. *The social syndrome of learned helplessness*⁹

To test quantitatively the hypothesis of syndrome of learned helplessness we used a polling technique designed by the researchers, its characteristics and polling results presented in Table 8 below.

⁹On August 12, 2010, Nickolas Eberstadt, an authoritative US demographer and political economist, expert on Russia, presented his report «Russia's Peacetime Demographic Crisis: Dimensions, Causes, Implications» in the Hudson Institute, Washington, DC, in which he noted the overall pessimism of Russians and their disposition towards depression.

Table 8. Social syndrome of learned helplessness

| Question | Yes, mostly yes | No, mostly no |
|---|------------------------|----------------------|
| Do you have a feeling that the country policy does not depend at all on public actions (voting at elections, public rallies, etc.)? | 82% | 10% |
| Do you have a feeling of disillusionment in Russian policy? | 81% | 9% |
| Do you have a feeling that the life of people in the country corresponds to the saying «dead end, wherever you push»? | 74% | 7% |
| Do you feel yourself at a loss and pessimistic with respect to the future of our country? | 66% | 15% |
| Do you have a feeling of flimsiness of Russian policy? | 63% | 16% |
| Do you have a feeling that Russia will eventually fail to have a strong democratic state, as compared to other countries? | 58% | 19% |
| Do you have a feeling of unpredictability of Russian policy? | 55% | 21% |
| Are you satisfied with current life of our country? | 11% | 74% |

Therefore, quantitative data confirm assumptions yielded by focus-groups on lack of trust in the authorities and on the presence of the social syndrome of learned helplessness among the Russian population.

The presence of that syndrome makes possible the following conclusions. Since, as the public believes, any attempts to change anything are futile, currently the population is not ready to implement scenarios of confronting the authorities. However such scenarios are gaining some probability since both sociological and psychological parts of our study indicate: the legitimacy of legal (constitutional) ways of refreshing the authorities has dropped sharply as visualized by the public.

The time has not come yet when the people become actually ready to change something instead of simply hoping for some changes or taking a fatalistic attitude. Some abstain from elections since they see no alternative, others trust the authorities because «everything's been decided for us long ago any way and they will elect the one they (the authorities) need», still some others are voting in protest being sure from the start that the results will be falsified anyhow. Thus people either do not believe in changes through elections or see nobody worthy of voting for.

Hence it was not random that the reaction to presidential elections was much weaker than the one to State Duma elections: the public did not place any expectations with those elections. As a result the public/authorities relations came to a dead end.

Having no political, social or any other influence, the opposition is incapable of offering anything but words, which the public has stopped trusting long ago. That is why the struggle of the opposition shapes itself into a struggle against the authorities, not for the people. This appears to be the fundamental weakness of the Russian opposition, and the public concludes that it simply wants «to carve out its own slice of power» or «suck itself up to the manger». Therefore supporting the opposition makes no sense. Dissatisfaction with the authorities is retained and growing, but the opposition gets no support as it offers nothing basically.

Conclusion from the above is that the public has an expressed demand for renewing the authorities (independent whether it comes from above or below). If that does not happen, one should expect a gradual lowering of social-psychological barriers for action. One may recall F. Hayek¹⁰ who insisted that the main advantage of democracy consisted in providing for non-violent change of the authorities. So far the authorities seem to be doing everything possible to provoke a forceful political transformation of the society, though the public is still incapable of performing it.

3.5. Ideas on the Existing and the Ideal Authorities among the Representatives of Other Nations Inhabiting Russia

Many political scientists believe that various ethnic communities may play some significant role in the political future of Russia. The cultural mentality of these peoples differs strongly from that of the Russian population, even at the everyday level.

Important also is the fact that birth rate in those peoples is much higher than that among the Russian population, and in longer prospect that will change the ethnic proportions of the country.

Media are often offering coverage (basically negative, as one may regret) of the events involving migrants from the national republics and those taking place in such republics themselves, especially those of the Northern Caucasus.

In the limelight of the importance of ethnic relations in modern Russia, serious scientific studies of these issues remain apparently short now. Another important point is that previously those regions of the Northern Caucasus belonged to the areas of the so-called «manageable voting». Mechanisms used to achieve that effect remain obscure and practically unstudied. They are in apparent contradiction with the results obtained during our survey.

¹⁰[Hayek, F.A. A Pernicious Presumption. The Errors of Socialism — Moscow: Novosti, 1992.](#)

However, practically parallel to our survey, Daghestan went through some serious changes in the electoral behavior of its population that practically coincides with the conclusions from our survey. As demonstrated in Chapter 6 dedicated to the outcome of the October elections, the hot news from the regional elections of October 14, 2012 was that the areas of «higher loyalty» voting drift towards the Russian-language regions. E.g. the Penza Oblast has confirmed its status of the «electorally controlled» region, the Krasnodar Province and the Saratov Oblast have strengthened their positions in this league.

Meanwhile voting in Northern Osetia, in Daghestan, in Kabardino-Balkaria and Karachayev-Cherkessia appeared to be much less unanimous than before. Opposition leaders and movements have formed there, capable of standing against the candidates from the authorities during elections and of attracting considerable number of votes.

Sociologists and political scientists have studied little the region of the Northern Caucasus. Part of the reason is that traditionally it displayed a high attendance percentage (the authorities considering the region «free of problems» due to that). Another such reason is that classical sociological focus-groups worked poorly in those ethnic republics. People offered prescribed normative answers, since they perceived polling experts as official executives¹¹. That is why the current study started with suggestion that projective psychological techniques would appear more effective with the dwellers of the Northern Caucasus, as opposed to the traditional sociological techniques. Drawing tests lift reflective barriers and reveal those emotions towards the authorities that remain masked by social regulations during sociological polling.

By way of an experiment laying a foundation for the future we ran one pilot focus-group with representatives of the Daghestani diaspora in Moscow. The criteria used to select respondents was not only their belonging to Daghestani nations, but the duration of their Moscow residence (5–10 years), plus the presence of actual links with Daghestan and regular trips to that republic.

Results of the survey have demonstrated extremely deep differences in the cultural and political mentality of the Russian vs. Daghestani people, corresponding quite well with differences observed during the October election campaigns.

3.5.1. The Daghestani ideas of the current authorities

3.5.1.1. Goals of the authorities

The ideas of the Daghestani public on the goals of the current authorities are presented in Table 9. Undoubtedly, certain similarities are seen when comparing the two sets. Note however not a single respondent in this group supposed that the authorities want to build a strong democratic state with liberal values, while the share

¹¹V.E. Shlyapentokh «Problems of Credibility of Sociological Information», Moscow: Statistika, 1986

of those who believe that the authorities want to build a strong authoritarian state is much higher than in the Russian population (40% against 15%).

Table 9. Goals of the Russian authorities as seen by Daghestani

| The authorities | Percentage |
|---|-------------------|
| Are incapable of explaining their goals to the public | 40% |
| Do not want to explain their goals to the public | 10% |
| Have personal enrichment as their goal | 10% |
| Want to build a strong authoritarian state | 40% |
| Want to build a strong democratic state with liberal values | 0% |


3.5.1.2. Emotional level perception of the authorities

Generally, the Daghestani attribute the same positive characteristics to the authorities as Russians, but while the Russians put forward such qualities as activity, intelligence, strong will, and strength (higher to lower rates), the Daghestani have that sequence as strong-willed, optimistic, intelligent, courageous.

It is also interesting to note that while the Russian public believes the authorities to be expressly evil, the Daghestani (as represented by the diaspora) see the authorities as kinder, though the actual value in that scale is close to zero.

The negative qualities of the Russian authorities most expressed as visualized by the Russian population are injustice, indifference, dishonesty, irresponsibility, and dangerousness. Daghestani representatives indicate such qualities as injustice, dishonesty, dependence and inconsistency. While the first two characteristics basically coincide with the ideas of the Russian population, the second two deviate sharply. Note that the Daghestani do not consider Russian authorities to be dangerous.

Figure 8. Current authorities as visualized by the Daghestani living in Moscow



3.5.1.3. Innermost level perception of interaction between the authorities and the public as expressed by the projective drawing tests

Projective drawing tests made it possible to reveal the following perception of the public and the authorities in focus-groups representing the Daghestani.

Current authorities are associated with predators only (100% of respondents). However the public is perceived as victims in 30% of cases. The principal images of prey is given by the «wolves-sheep» and «bear-foxes» pairs.

The authorities are strong-willed, intelligent, not evil, but dishonest, unjust, dependent and inconsistent, in other words we arrive at the same result: *as visualized by the Daghestani, the authorities are not as dangerous as visualized by the Russian population.*

The pair «Authorities are replete dogs, the public are hungry wolves» scored the largest number of votes (30%). Answering the question whether the wolves can take away the piece they deserve from the dogs, all three respondents stated «sure». This

response is colorfully illustrated by an excerpt from the same focus-group. We are giving it in full, though the piece relevant to the topic is its last fragment.

- *The TV is showing national problems completely wrong both in Moscow and in Daghestan. Some street fight in Moscow may be presented so that they start calling us from Daghestan asking whether they have started cutting up the Daghestanis already. We answer them saying that nothing of the kind happens, everything is quiet, it's just they presented it so on the TV. Or, vice versa, they tell on the news that a DPS post [highway patrol post] was blown up in Daghestan. And that the special police force is now in battle against the insurgents, with injured and dead around. We call home and ask: what is it, did a war break out? They answer us saying: no, it's just some showdown on the road. So what is that show down? The road has a number of DPS posts, each taking so much graft that not everybody could raise the money to reach destination, wherever needed. Well, they got tired of that, blew up a couple of them. Grafting stopped immediately. Now one can drive through quietly, nobody's checking anything and takes no money (a Daghestani female, 43, no university degree, married. Two children, lives in Moscow with her family for about 10 years).*

Table 10. Associative images of the public and the authorities generated by the Daghestani in the course of assessing current authorities

| The authorities | The public | Percentage |
|------------------------|-------------------|-------------------|
| Dogs | Wolves | 30% |
| Bear | Foxes | 20% |
| Bear | Whale | 10% |
| Wolf | Dogs | 10% |
| Wolf | Sheep | 10% |
| Bear cub | Sheep | 10% |
| Eagle | Cows | 10% |

- *Authorities are large satiated dogs, and the public is hungry wolves, they can snatch a large piece from the dogs.*
- *Authorities are a bear, and the public is a whale, the public does not depend on the authorities in any way, they cannot do anything to it. It is larger than the largest bear, fighting on its premises the bear stands no chance.*

In all the drawings, same as in the drawings of the Russian people, any link between the public and the authorities is absent.

3.5.1.4. Innermost level perception of interaction between the authorities and the public as expressed by M.Lüscher Color Test


Tracing the correlation of colors for the public and the authorities, one may add that 60% of the polled Daghestani showed negativism towards the authorities, which is much higher than what the Russian people had (see Table 11).

Table 11. Color combinations describing the public and the current authorities as visualized by the Daghestani

| The authorities | The public | Meaning of the color combination | Percentage |
|------------------------|-------------------|--|-------------------|
| Black | Red | Authorities bear a threatening authority, generating negativism | 60% |
| Red | Red | Red for the public indicates the impossibility of dominant behavior, giving birth to the image of a «miserable sufferer» protecting him/herself from frustration | 20% |
| Red | Green | Red is in the lead, seeking for authority and domination while green is offering certain resistance. Note that green only fights back when something touches it personally and remains indifferent otherwise | 20% |

Fig. 9 presents a drawing characterizing interrelations between the public and the current authorities as visualized by the Daghestani.

Figure 9. Interrelations between the public and the current authorities as visualized by the Daghestani



3.5.1.5. Attitudes of Moscow Daghestani residents to Moscow and the Muscovites

Characteristics of the Daghestani manifest themselves spectacularly in still another aspect, namely – in their attitude towards the Muscovites:

- *Muscovites are bears in hibernation, while the Daghestani are ferocious dogs, since they are ill, wounded, that is why they behave wild. Muscovites are in hibernation because they have power, stores of lard, but they are using nothing, just sleep away, too well-to-do.*
- *Muscovites are the sheep, while the Daghestani are noble deers, they never offend the sheep but are stronger than the sheep and nobler. Muscovites, they are «a grey mass».*

These excerpts demonstrate that the Daghestani consider themselves being stronger and more aggressive than the Muscovites (the Russians), and if they want or are forced to by their need (Daghestani are ill, hungry) they will «eat» them up. Many respondents claimed that it will happen so in longer prospect.

3.5.2. Ideas about the ideal authorities

3.5.2.1. Ideas about the ideal leader

The image of the ideal leader among the Daghestani and the Russians differ as well. While the Russians consider such qualities as justice, intelligence and patriotism to be most valid for the ideal leader, the Daghestani name those of responsibility, strong will and competence. Justice appears to come as No 6 for them, and patriotism as No 10.

Interestingly, the least important characteristics of an ideal leader for the Daghestanis appeared to be kindness (7 points), safety (9 points), honesty (7 points), and optimism (0 points). The scale of «Freedom granting – freedom limiting» appeared to be biased to the left, receiving a value of -4, i.e. an ideal leader is a freedom limiting one. We remember that kindness, safety and freedom granting appeared to be the least valid for the Russian population as well, but with the Daghestani those scales had optimism and honesty added (see Table 12).

Table 12. The image of the ideal leader as visualized by the Daghestani

| Characteristic | Scaleweight |
|-----------------------|--------------------|
| Responsibility | 20 |
| Strong will | 20 |
| Competence | 20 |
| Persuasiveness | 19 |
| Intelligence | 19 |
| Justice | 18 |
| Strength | 18 |
| Activity | 17 |
| Consistency | 17 |
| Patriotism | 15 |
| Courage | 15 |

3.5.2.2. Ideas about the ideal authorities

Drawing tests have yielded the following results (see Table 13).

80% of the Daghestani respondents see a link between the public and the ideal authorities. The results obtained may be separated into three groups. Group 1 (50% of respondents, the images of wolf / wolfpack, bee queen/bees): respondents understand their responsibility to the authorities; group 2 (30% of respondents): respondents expect the authorities to feed them and take decisions for them (this is the «Russian»

type of responses); group 3 (20% of respondents): these see no link between the ideal public and the ideal authorities and are still in an aggressive mood towards the authorities.

Comparing those data with the data yielded by the Russian population we see that about 40% of Russian respondents expect that the authorities would feed the public and take decisions for it while 60% are ready to serve the authorities, provided the latter would be just. Aggression towards ideal authorities never surfaced in explanations by the Russian respondents. Meanwhile one should note that such images as wolf/wolfpack, where the leader is the first among the equals was also never encountered among the Russians.

Table 13. Daghestani images of the ideal authorities yielded provided by projective drawing tests

| The authorities the | The public | Percentage |
|----------------------------|-------------------|-------------------|
| Wolf | Wolfpack | 30% |
| Bee (ant) queen | Bees, ants | 20% |
| Lion | Bisons | 10% |
| Bear | Elephant | 10% |
| Cow | Calf | 10% |
| She-wolf | Wolf cub | 10% |
| Shepherd | Sheep | 10% |

- *The public and the authorities are a wolfpack together, simply the authorities are in the lead.*
- *The public are the ants, laborious and faithful to their anthill (the state) and to their authorities – the ant queen.*
- *The authorities area lion, majestic and untouchable. Meanwhile the public are the buffalo: they are strong, courageous, the lions are afraid to attack strong animals, it's only the weak and the young that are their prey. As a matter of fact, the buffalo are capable of shredding the lion, and the lion knows that.*

3.5.2.3. Processing drawing tests using the Lüscher Color Test


The processing of drawings using the M.Lüscher Color Test allowed to obtain the data presented below (see Table 14) that are basically similar to those recorded for the Russian population. The test revealed no significant differences.

Table 14. Color combinations describing the interaction between the public and the ideal authorities as visualized by Daghestanis

| The authorities | The public | Meaning of color combination | Percentage |
|------------------------|-------------------|---|-------------------|
| Blue | Blue | Quietude, contentment, feeling of unity and harmony | 50% |
| Green | Green | «Green» authorities reach for high status, «green» public is not ready to take responsibility and delegates it to the authorities | 30% |
| Red | Green | Red is in the lead, seeking for authority and domination while green is offering certain resistance. Note that green only fights back when something touches it personally and remains indifferent otherwise. | 10% |
| Blue | Red | Red is in the lead. Blue devoid of red is left without its activity, its «living strength» | 10% |

Figure 10 represents ideal authorities and their interaction with the public as visualized by Daghestanis.

Figure 10. Ideal authorities and their interaction with the people as visualized by Daghestanis



3.5.3. Current psychological state of the Daghestani community members in Moscow

During the study into the existence of the learned helplessness syndrome among the respondents from the Daghestani focus-group, results were obtained that make it possible to suggest that this syndrome is rather non-existent among this community's members (see Table 15).

Table 15. Social syndrome of learned helplessness among the Daghestani

| Question | Yes, rather yes | No, rather not |
|---|-----------------|----------------|
| Do you have a feeling that the country policy does not depend at all on public actions (voting at elections, public rallies, etc.)? | 50% | 40% |
| Do you have a feeling of disillusionment in Russian policy? | 70% | 30% |
| Do you have a feeling that the life of people in the country corresponds to the saying «dead end, wherever you push»? | 40% | 50% |
| Do you feel yourself at a loss and pessimistic with respect to the future of our country? | 30% | 60% |
| Do you have a feeling of flimsiness of Russian policy? | 40% | 60% |
| Do you have a feeling that Russia will eventually fail to have a strong democratic state, as compared to other countries? | 80% | 10% |
| Do you have a feeling of unpredictability of Russian policy? | 0% | 90% |
| Are you satisfied with current life of our country? | 30% | 70% |

It should be noted that the focus-group was formed of Daghestani currently living in Moscow so it is difficult to assert the validity of this methodology in respect of the community members i.e. those who obviously seek to improve their living conditions through changing their place of residence and are working actively towards that goal.

However, the Daghestani, similarly to the Russians, agree that the legitimacy of authorities' renewal is decreasing. They also agree that the authorities seek to build an authoritarian state. Combined with a more pronounced aggression towards the authorities, contrary to the ethnic Russians, these data make one think that North Caucasian peoples are already ready for a revolution or other acts of violence, and this aptitude is not latent as is the case with the ethnic Russians. In addition to the survey results, this fact is regularly confirmed by mass media reports.

3.6. Perception of the existing and ideal authorities by Moscow teenagers

The disintegration of the USSR and emergence of modern Russia were a cultural shock for people of all ages who had been socialized in the Soviet Union.

A hypothesis was put forward in the 1990s that the consequences of this cultural shock mainly affected the middle aged and the elderly, and the new generations

entering their working age after the crisis would have a different mentality and would be better adjusted to the market and democracy conditions. The hypothesis did not prove quite accurate. Apparently, the parents' influence factor (and, possibly, some other factors)¹² was so strong that the process of mentality change in the new able-bodied generation extended over 20 years, and is currently still far from completion.

Today, at the beginning of the 2010s, a new generation is growing up, with absolutely different startup conditions. Nevertheless, once they are past their teenage phase, this age group will encounter numerous life problems of various origin (including the long-term consequences of the global economic crisis). No data are available today to predict which of the above factors will prevail, or what the cumulative result of these factors will be: either "Soviet style", or "Modernization." There is however a real opportunity to study today's political mentality of the teenagers; at least it will turn substantial in forming political and other mindsets of this generation in the future.

In consideration of the above, the researchers established a pilot focus-group of Moscow teenagers (secondary school students) aged 12 and 13 to identify their political mindsets.

The survey revealed substantial differences between the political mindsets of the teenagers and the adult Russian population in Moscow.

3.6.1. Perception of the existing authorities

3.6.1.1. Objectives of the authorities

With respect to the objectives of the existing authorities, most teenagers believe that the authorities either aim at personal gain, or do not want to explain their objectives to the people (see Table 16).

Table 16. Objectives of the existing authorities as perceived by teenagers

| Objectives of the authorities | Answers |
|---|----------------|
| The objective of the authorities is personal gain | 40% |
| The authorities do not want to explain their objectives to the people | 40% |


¹²For instance, US researcher D. Easton holds that political attitudes, views and values evolve from non-political foundations such as authority relations in family, in social, particularly, teenage groups of which the individuals form part. After growing up, human beings apply the already familiar ideas to political processes. In addition, there are national political culture traditions, benchmark concepts of ideal authority and correlation of the actual authority members against the above benchmarks. Easton D., "Categories of System-Based Political Analysis"// Political Sciences: Compiled by: M.A.Vasilik, M.S. Vershinin – Moscow: Gardariky, 2000. pp. 319–331.

| | |
|---|-----|
| The authorities want to build a strong democratic state with liberal values | 10% |
| The authorities want to build a strong authoritarian state | 10% |
| The authorities are unable to explain their objectives to the people | 0% |

3.6.1.2. Perception of the authorities at the emotional level

Teenagers perceive today’s authorities as strong, strong-willed, freedom-granting and independent while at the same time dangerous, dishonest and irresponsible (see Figure 11).

Figure 11. The existing authorities as perceived by teenagers



3.6.1.3. Innermost level perception of interaction between the authorities and the public as expressed by projective drawing tests

Projective drawing tests revealed the following perception of the authorities and the public by the teenager focus-group (see Table 17).

Modern authorities are associated with predators (40% of the respondents), dangerous animals such as boars (20% of the respondents), and unpleasant animals (rats, goats – 30% of the respondents). People are perceived as victims (hedgehogs, rabbits, jerboas) by 30%. Sixty per cent of teenagers perceived people also as wicked, and only 10% – as hard-working ants.

These data match well the data obtained in the teenager group using the semantic differential technique where they perceive the authorities as strong-willed, strong and freedom-granting which makes it possible for the people also to be aggressive, but the authorities are irresponsible, unsafe and dishonest thus making the people “snag their piece.”

None of the drawings show any link between the people and the authorities.

Table 17. Associative comparisons of the people and the authorities in assessment of the existing authorities by teenagers

| The authorities | The people | Percentage |
|------------------------|-----------------------|-------------------|
| Wolves | Ants, jerboas | 20% |
| Lion | Hyenas, foxes | 20% |
| Boars | Hedgehogs, stray dogs | 20% |
| Goats | Rats, hyenas | 20% |
| Zebras | Rabbits | 10% |
| Rats | Foxes | 10% |

- *The authorities are wolves, they are dangerous predators, one wolf is capable of eating away a dozen of jerboas, and in general, wolves are good at hunting jerboas.*
- *The authorities are a lion who lives off the others, and the people are hyenas ready to bite and tear anybody to death.*
- *The authorities are a lion and the people are foxes who are insolent and cunning, each one for oneself.*

3.6.1.4. Innermost level perception of interaction between the authorities and the public as expressed by M.Lüscher Color Test

The processing of drawings using the Lüscher Color Test yielded the data presented below (see Table 18).


Table 18. Color combinations of the public and the existing authorities as visualized by teenagers

| The authorities | The public | Meaning of the color combination | Percentage,% |
|------------------------|-------------------|--|---------------------|
| Red | Red | Red for the public indicates the impossibility of dominant behavior, giving birth to the image of a «miserable sufferer» protecting him/herself from frustration | 30% |
| Black | Red | The authorities have menacing influence which causes negativism | 60% |
| Red | Green | Red is in the lead seeking power and domination while the green tries to restrain it. Green fights back only if personally affected otherwise it remains indifferent | 10% |

It is noteworthy that, percentage-wise, these color combinations are very similar to those obtained in the Daghestani focus-group. However, Russian teenagers perceive the people as victims more frequently. The negativism shown towards the authorities may be explained by general teenagers' negativism as well as the influence of the social environment with which teenagers of this age are already closely interacting.

Figure 12 shows teenagers' perception of the relations between the people and the existing authorities.

Figure 12. Teenagers' perception of the relations between the people and the existing authorities



3.6.2. Notion of ideal authorities

3.6.2.1. Notion of an ideal leader

Teenagers' notions of an ideal leader yield two scales with a negative value (no negative value with the Russian population, one negative value with Daghestanis – restricted freedom). In teenagers' view, an ideal leader should be impulsive rather than quiet, and impassive rather than supportive because *“If he is not indifferent to everybody who comes to complain about his/her life, it would be impossible to work,”* and *“his job is not to feel pity for sufferers but to manage the state, and this takes certain cruelty.”*

The most important features of an ideal leader as seen by Russian teenagers are patriotism, honesty, competence and granting freedoms. These data only coincide with those for the Russian adult population in respect of patriotism.

The features of an ideal leader that are least important for teenagers include kindness (0 points), optimism (0 points), bravery and power of conviction (3 points

each). The kindness of an ideal leader is not important for any of the respondents, and in this respect the results of teenagers are similar to those of adults.

A significant difference in teenagers' answers is found in freedom granting: it was immaterial for the adult Russian population, and moved to the negative pole – freedom restriction – for the Daghestani. But this difference may not yet be considered a material cross-generation and even cross-cultural (from socialism to democracy) difference. An answer to this question may only be provided by 6 to 8 year long longitude research.

Table 19. Teenagers' notions of an ideal leader

| Characteristic | Scale points |
|-------------------------|---------------------|
| Patriotic | 20 |
| Honest | 19 |
| Competent | 19 |
| Freedom granting | 15 |
| Fair | 15 |
| Independent | 14 |
| Smart | 14 |
| Strong | 13 |
| Strong-willed | 12 |
| Safe | 10 |
| Consistent | 8 |
| Responsible | 5 |
| Dynamic | 4 |
| Brave | 4 |
| Calm | 3 |
| Persuasive | 3 |
| Kind –wicked | 0 |
| Optimistic –pessimistic | 0 |
| Impulsive | -1 |
| Impassive | - 1 |

3.6.2.2. Notions of ideal authorities

The drawing tests yielded the following results (see Table 20).

For 100% of the teenagers, there is connection between the people and ideal authorities. None of the answers show aggression towards ideal authorities just like for the adult Russian population.

Everybody emphasizes the commonality of the objectives of the people and the authorities. In this respect the answers of the Russian teenagers are closer to those of the Daghestani than the adult Russian population.

Hence, ideal authorities for teenagers are a system into which society and state are integrated.

Table 20. Teenagers' notions of ideal authorities as yielded by projective drawing tests

| The authorities are associated with | The people are associated with | Percentage, % |
|--|---------------------------------------|----------------------|
| Wolf | Wolfpack | 40% |
| Lion | Lion pride | 30% |
| Ant queen | Ants | 20% |
| Elephant | Tigers | 10% |

- *The authorities are the leader wolf, and the people are its wolfpack. Wolves are strong animals, they behave fair, help each other, share the catch with those unable to go hunting...*
- *The authorities are the lion protecting its pride boundaries, and the people are pride lionesses, providing food and prosperity for themselves and the lion.*

3.6.2.3. Perception of interaction between the authorities and the people at the innermost level using the Lüscher Color Test


The processing of drawings using the M.Lüscher Color Test produced the data presented below (see Table 21).

Table 21. Color combinations of the people and the authorities as visualized by teenagers for the case of ideal authorities

| Color of the authorities | Color of the people | Meaning of the color combination | Percentage, % |
|---------------------------------|----------------------------|---|----------------------|
| Blue | Blue | Quietude, contentment, feeling of unity and harmony | 90% |
| Red | Green | The red is the master seeking power and domination while the green tries to restrain it. But the green fights back only if personally affected otherwise it remains indifferent | 10% |

Figure 13 shows the ideal authorities and their relationships with the people as perceived by teenagers.

Figure 13. Ideal authorities and their relations with the people as perceived by teenagers.



As stated before, we are unable to tell how these mindsets would change under the influence of life circumstances to be faced by teenagers as they grow up.

In general, based on the results of the pilot group it may be assumed that a generation is growing in Russia which is better prepared for the market and democracy than all the previous ones. Moreover, this generation displays patriotism and eagerness to work in the unified team of the authorities and the people without talking about the duty of the authorities to feed the people and think for it. That is why the report authors believe in the credibility of the hypothesis that the change of political mindsets in the course of the generation shift is real and irreversible even though it is slower than thought before.

It should be taken into account that the teenagers who are now 12 to 16 year old will be 18 year old or older by 2018 (when a new presidential election is held in Russia), i.e. they will make a certain cohort of voters, though not too numerous but quite possibly politically active. As it follows from the experience of other countries (from France in 1968 to Arab countries in 2010) student youth may play an important role in the processes of protest-inspired political transformation of the society.

3.7. Disposition of Russian society to the ideas of socialism and democracy

While conducting focus-groups with representatives of the Russian population and the Daghestani, respondents were asked questions how, in their opinion, the propaganda of socialist and democratic ideas may influence the people. The results are presented below.

3.7.1. Propaganda of socialist ideas

When the question was asked whether propagandist pumping of socialist ideas may have any impact on the people, most of the respondents answered in the negative.

Excerpts from the focus-groups:

- *I believe that communism in its pure form is already outdated, and needs to be revised.*
- *Many people will even be frightened by propaganda, to some extent, because there've been quite a few appeals to the people to strive for something however nothing works anywhere in our environment.*

On the whole, out of 50 respondents 16% are ready to support socialist ideas but even these respondents say that the ideas in themselves could hardly influence them.

3.7.2. Propaganda of democratic ideas

The conversations with focus-group respondents revealed that the respondents were not quite clear about the very essence of democratic ideas. If, when the propaganda of socialist ideas was mentioned, they provided an answer without thinking too much, which is easily explained by the fact that people know what is socialism, then when asked to which extent they could be prone to strong and competent propaganda of democratic ideas, their answers were as follows:

- *Democratic, or rather Swedish democracy, Norwegian democracy, with a socialist bias.*

That is to say, the conversation is once again back to the mainstream that the only thing that may have an effect on the people today is real deeds. The population does not have a clear idea of what democracy is because a normal democratic society has never been built in this country. Therefore, under certain conditions the people are ready to respond to democratic and market propaganda but only if it is ***based on some kind of real actions***.

- *We do not trust words, we will only believe deeds and actions, but none of it is there.*

3.7.3. Lack of introjected understanding of democracy among the Russian population

The survey results create the impression that the national self-awareness of the people is rather infantile. The people are offended by the authorities, they complain about the injustice and dishonesty of the authorities, about social vulnerability, they feel deceived, and do not believe in anything anymore. When thinking about ideal authorities the people are willing to serve to a fair and patriotic leader even though restricting freedom but caring for, feeding and thinking for the people.

Two thirds of the respondents have a learned helplessness syndrome, and believe they are absolutely unable to influence the developments occurring in the country, and already do not want to influence anything showing passivity and fatalism.

Even though for the last 20 years the authorities and mass media have been regularly emphasizing the value of democratic ideas, moreover, the population itself gladly uses the notion of “democracy”, everything that any democratic society really relies upon – law, elections, freedom of entrepreneurship, private property – is practically never mentioned in the focus-groups. It is only law that is mentioned sometimes but even then it is done to stress that the authorities should respect the laws they themselves adopt. Moreover, freedom of entrepreneurship and private property even provoke irritation. Thus, an example of democratic state that could be interiorized by society has never been built in this country over the past years. In the absence of an internal example of democratic state the population is unable to compare the ideas of any given orientation suggested to society against the internal example.

It may be assumed that even the Russian elite that also originates from the Soviet Union, while understanding what democracy means in theory, however lacks an internally formed introjection of democratic society. It appears that it would take at least a generation to build up such an introjection.

Figure 14. Positive characteristics of the Russian authorities

| | |
|--|----|
| Childbirth benefits, maternity capital, attempt to raise the birth rate in the country | 57 |
| Ability to speak eloquently | 54 |
| Fight against terrorism | 53 |
| Development of high technologies | 51 |
| Increase in wages and pensions | 43 |
| Investment in sports | 42 |
| Strengthened position of Russia globally | 39 |
| Disclosure of officials' earnings | 36 |
| Longing to strengthen Russia's role in the world | 34 |
| Longing to preserve the country | 33 |
| Accessibility | 32 |
| Longing to make Russia a leader among the world's powers | 29 |
| Officials' appeal to the church, longing to improve their spirituality | 26 |
| Availability of the opportunity to ask questions of Putin | 24 |
| Care about young people | 24 |
| Mobility | 24 |
| Strengthened defense capability | 23 |
| Ability of rich people to use the money | 22 |
| Demolition of Khrushchyovkas (low-cost apartment houses built in Khrushchev's times) | 20 |
| Attempt to control the situation | 20 |
| Restraining inflation | 20 |
| Increased fight against crime | 18 |
| Aspiration to increase the cultural level of the people | 18 |
| Longing for the better | 18 |
| Longing to resolve the burning issues | 16 |
| Well-educated, professional | 16 |
| Economic development of the country | 16 |
| Longing to improve the life in the country | 16 |
| Democratism | 16 |
| Ensured stability | 15 |
| Ability to rely on the historical experience | 14 |
| Democracy established in the country | 12 |
| Ensured security | 12 |
| Introduction of mortgage lending – care for the middle class | 12 |
| Longing to keep the officials once they become 'one of the company' | 10 |
| Longing to develop the country's economy | 10 |
| Longing not to tread water, think about the country's future | 10 |
| Understanding what needs to be done | 9 |
| Interested in the people's opinion | 8 |
| Care for the people | 8 |
| Care for pensioners | 5 |
| Honesty towards the people | 2 |
| Social programmes for the disabled | 2 |




Figure 15. Negative characteristics of the Russian authorities

| | |
|---|----|
| Ongoing increase in utility prices | 94 |
| Bad solutions to the housing problem | 81 |
| Collapse of the economy and agriculture | 75 |
| Ever-lasting talk about anticorruption campaign with no real action taken | 70 |
| Seeking to retain their power in any way possible | 67 |
| Seeking to get everything for themselves and their relatives, clan system | 66 |
| Introduction of Unified State Examination | 64 |
| Poor follow-up of decision implementation | 62 |
| Inability to improve the enforcement of law and order in the country | 62 |
| Active only during elections | 60 |
| Reduced number of government-paid university students | 58 |
| Seeking benefits only for themselves | 58 |
| Disrespect for their own country laws | 57 |
| Transferring their money abroad | 56 |
| Improper police actions | 53 |
| Inefficient social policy | 53 |
| Endarkenment of the people | 52 |
| Alienation from the people | 51 |
| No care for the old people | 49 |
| Good at stealing and paying to remain in power | 48 |
| Uncertainty of the future | 48 |
| The fact that civil servants are better off than entrepreneurs | 48 |
| Robbing the people | 48 |
| Beadledom | 47 |
| Demagogy, only slogans and promises | 46 |
| The fact that this policy is only beneficial for the rich | 46 |
| Enslaving terms of mortgage lending | 46 |
| Longing to enjoy a better life than common people, caring for themselves only | 45 |
| The fact that Russia is given a raw-exports role in the world | 43 |
| Inefficient economic policy | 42 |
| Only good at promoting their own image | 42 |
| Creating life conditions that make people think how to let their flat in Russia | 41 |
| Ongoing inflation in the country that eats up pensions and wages, and child benefits | 40 |
| Longing to make a profit for themselves, and for this purpose making deals with anybody | 39 |
| Ever-lasting lies | 36 |
| Inability to build a professional army, weak army | 35 |
| Managerial incompetence – unprofessionalism | 33 |
| Irresponsibility, hollow promises | 29 |
| Do not know what needs to be done | 28 |
| Prowestern views | 22 |
| The fact that democracy in the country is in danger as shown by the latest elections | 22 |
| Ignorance of the history and culture of their own people | 21 |
| Confused | 15 |
| Earthliness | 13 |



Chapter 4. Results of surveying protest rally participants

4.1. Dynamics in the numbers of opposition movements in Russia

As it follows from the results of interviewing protest rally participants, there was a split in the respondents' opinions as to declining opposition movements.

Involvement in the opposition movement is declining in the country, coming to a halt, according to the first group. People are getting disillusioned, and are conscious that what is going on is meaningless, the rallies and opposition protests resulted in nothing. The authorities are not responding, and the opposition has faded out. Nobody has emerged on the opposition movement tide, and a kind of stagnation is back again.

The other group of respondents believes that the mass-scale protest is not declining but moving into a different stage which has not taken shape yet. Their opinion is based on the fact that the number of those dissatisfied with the existing authorities is not decreasing but keeps growing. And the opposition movement (though not quite successfully yet) is looking for other forms to express its activity.

Both groups coincide in that there are no new charismatic politicians in this country, and the existing opposition leaders do not come up with concrete solutions, do not have a programme, do not clearly articulate the protest moods, and lack a clear-cut goal.

As it follows from Table 22, most of the participants of the quantitative survey agree that the opposition movement in the country is declining (54%). 32% of the respondents disagree, and 16% found it difficult to answer.

Table 22

| Do you agree with the opinion that opposition movements are declining in this country? | |
|---|-----|
| Definitely yes | 27 |
| Rather yes | 27 |
| Rather no | 16 |
| Definitely no | 14 |
| Difficult to answer | 16 |
| Total | 100 |

A. The opposition movement is declining

- *The opposition movement is declining because its leaders do not come up with anything concrete. The people have stopped going out into the streets because nothing changes, they believe it is an absolute waste of time (man, 31 years old, higher education).*

B. The opposition movement is not declining but moving into a different stage

- *I would not say it is declining, I'd rather say it is taking a different shape. The protest movement has moved away from trivial rallies, one could say so. The people who are discontent with the authorities were initially sticking to rallies but now they are thinking about some other forms. The number of people is not decreasing, it is just that the opposition movement is choosing some other loopholes to manifest their activity (man, 36years old, higher education).*

4.2. Ideological vectors among the opposition movement

As it follows from the survey results, most of the respondents agree to the opinion that there are no definite ideological avenues of the opposition movement in today's Russia, articulated in clear-cut programmes and represented by new or old wave politicians. The rally participants polled could only name a small number of opposition leaders, primarily A. Navalny, S. Udaltsov, D. Gudkov, G. Gudkov, E. Chirikova, B. Nemtsov etc.

A. Navalny and B. Nemtsov are to a greater extent referred to as the right opposition, and more specifically its liberal branch. It focuses on increased role of the law, war on corruption and abuse of official position.

The "left" front is represented by S. Udaltsov, though he is considered a young politician lacking much experience. E. Limonov is regarded nationalist even though he is currently staying away from politics. A special area of the opposition movement is environmentalist movements including E. Chirikova. The ideological field of the opposition movement is limited to the above key avenues.

Given the fact that these avenues are largely personified, the respondents provided the following profiles of the leaders of these movements.

A. Alexey Navalny

- *I believe he does a more real business. He has some kind of agency of his own which engages in various anticorruption measures and investigates different corruption schemes. From this perspective, he has been basically*

a success because he has really dug out lots of things. It is true though that I don't know what methods and techniques he applies to manage it (man, 31 years old, higher education).

- *B. Sergey Udaltsov*
- *Udaltsov is a rather educated and charismatic person. The only thing is that he is still short of experience in terms of conducting serious debates and the like. But in spite of his education he is a young politician if he can be called one at all. Besides, he has a slight bias towards radicalization. Udaltsov is still more on the talking side at the moment (man, 31 years old, higher education).*

C. Nationalists

- *Well, we could also separately single out the nationalists – the Patriotic Forces that have also joined the protest movement (man, 34years old, higher education).*

D. Elena Chirikova

- *What kind of leaders do we have now? For instance, Chirikova is trying to find a solution, there was a project to protect the Khimki Woods, but basically they are all the same so my attitude to them is based on this. I wouldn't single her out as any particular movement (Moscow, man, 37 years old, higher education).*

4.3. Opinions of focus-group members about simultaneous decline in Putin's rating and weakening of the protest movement

Most of the respondents stressed that the decline in Putin's rating and weakening of the protest movement are developments occurring by themselves, and are not interrelated. Putin's rating is falling for a good reason and consistently because nothing changes in the country. The trust in him shown during the election has not been justified, and the people's discontent is growing.

As regards the decline of protest mood, then, as stated before, the key factor is the absence of remarkable leaders and intelligible ideas, according to the respondents. Nevertheless, the protest potential is growing in society so the search for new leaders is being latently activated though it is a slow process impeded by repressive actions of the authorities. And yet, spontaneous search for new leaders continues.

Many survey participants noted that Vladimir Putin's rating is something that is to a great extent artificial, that it is easy to raise it through simple steps, actions,

promotion and mass media provided domination is ensured on TV and the political field is “cleansed.”

- *I believe that Putin’s rating is falling for a good reason since it is clear that this country needs changes both politically and economically. But in real life nothing is done. That’s why the electorate looking for changes is naturally moving away from Putin. In terms of the declined rating of the opposition I believe that this is due to the fact that, once again, no platform has been put forward, a programme that would be supported if not by a majority then at least by large social groups (man, 55 years old, higher education).*

4.4. Lost feeling of unity at protest rallies

Most of the respondents said that during the latest rallies a certain feeling of unity they had experienced before, during the earlier protests, began to disappear. As stressed by the interviewed, those who had come to the first meetings, even though quite diverse, aligned with each other. There was unity and a certain state of mind. At the latest rally held on 12 September 2012 that feeling was gone, there was instead a feeling of despair, hopelessness and meaninglessness of the protest. The leaders who spoke to the people were doing it formally, without a definite objective, nor effective rhetoric.

However, many of protest participants believe that this is something temporary. On the one hand, it is quite logical that people are splitting into factions depending on their convictions and interests, and the process is not over yet. On the other hand, the opposition has common interests based on which it may be united, even though temporarily (for instance, based on the idea of honest election). The opposition movement is currently living through a certain setback. After a while, it will restructure itself and will start gaining momentum again.

- *It seems that at the latest meeting people’s togetherness dropped. Maybe different political forces had started, step by step, dragging in different direction before but then it was not so apparent (man, 27 years old, higher education).*
- *At the meetings in winter, and then in spring, the people seemed to be together. Left-minded, right-minded, different, all the people were quite diverse at the meetings but they seemed to have the same goal, one could feel some meaning. But then we came to the latest meeting, and it became clear all at once that everybody was all by him/herself, and there was some kind of sadness, resentment (woman, 38 years old, higher education).*

4.5. Attitude to the establishment of new political parties

As it follows from the survey results, most of the rally participants have a negative view of the Russian party system. All the parties existing in today's political space are perceived as "pro-Kremlin", inactive and meaningless.

There are no opposition parties. *The respondents doubt it could be possible to establish them.* People have no confidence neither in new political parties and their leaders, nor in political ideas and organizations of various kind. The people are united by discontent, which however is not yet a stimulus to create new political parties.

A priori negative attitude to political parties is one of the deterrents for the growth of opposition movement. There are currently no signs that this situation is changing. This may seem to be a kind of deadlock. However, political vacuum creates prerequisites for emergence of new leaders.

- *And now it seems to me that there are people not affiliated with any particular party but simply tired of being so boldly deceived. Those are people who got together via the Internet, via social networks. They are not members of any party but they are united exactly by their discontent that, to put it rudely, they are being openly friggged (Moscow, man, 27 years old, higher education).*

Chapter 5. Perception of potential political leaders: Alexei Kudrin, Dmitry Rogozin and Igor Shuvalov

5.1. Alexei Kudrin

According to a majority of the respondents, Alexei Kudrin is a professional in his field being a competent financier. A majority of the respondents generally have a positive attitude to him. The respondents emphasized his sincerity and principled stand, the features that are quite rare for modern politicians. The respondents stressed that he was quite up to the mark in his position, had gained a lot of experience and could become a new prime minister. He is a good leader, well-balanced and capable of standing his ground and managing the staff.

But when it comes to the attitude to him as a national political leader, many people mentioned that he lacks the leader's qualities necessary for this, cannot clearly outline his position, he often hesitates and doubts his own decisions.

- *He was, perhaps, the best financier in this country. And to my mind, the stabilization of Russia's economy after 2000 was due in no small part to his work in the Putin's team (Vladimir, man, 65 years old, no higher education).*
- *In my view, he is one of the most adequate officials in the Putin's administration. He is a person that it is basically possible to come to terms with. He even spoke at one of the opposition's meetings which is quite noteworthy. In the end, he was certainly barracked but anyway it inspires respect that he at least tried to establish a dialogue unlike many others (Moscow, man, 27 years old, higher education).*

When an issue of A. Kudrin as a possible political party leader was raised, many respondents would note that there was no need for him to lead a party because it takes certain leader's qualities, charisma and dynamism that A. Kudrin lacks. Moreover, many respondents today do not think it is necessary to establish any party at all. In their opinion, it may only worsen the image of its potential leader.

- *He has really an idea to somehow wake up the people, help them to take some initiative, to act. He is known as a competent and experienced person. But the people here are not yet ready to support initiatives. As far as a party is concerned, he'll be less successful. He needs to work for the country, be in the Government, people will see it, he is respected (Vladimir, man, 47 years old, no higher education).*

A. Kudrin’s recognizability rating is pretty high. 74% of the respondents answered they know A. Kudrin, 23% said they don’t. Nevertheless, his credibility rating is rather low– 27%. 42% do not trust him.

Table 23

| Do you know A. Kudrin? | |
|--------------------------------|----|
| Yes, I do | 48 |
| I’ve heard something | 26 |
| No, I don’t | 23 |
| It’s difficult to answer | 3 |
| Do you trust A. Kudrin? | |
| Yes, I do | 14 |
| I rather trust | 13 |
| I rather don’t trust | 13 |
| No, I don’t | 29 |
| It’s difficult to answer | 31 |

Our research does not provide any clear answer on the feasibility and relevance of the establishment of a political party by A. Kudrin in the future.

However, based on the long-standing research experience (including the results of the psychological part of the survey), we may express our opinion that the first and most important place in the conscience of the Russian population is held not so much by personal charismatic qualities that are more typical of political extremist movements’ leaders but rather by the public status of the leader combined with the fact that such a status should be well deserved based on the statesman’s experience and all the preceding political biography.

It is no by chance that one of the most common statements made in the focus-groups conducted over the last two or three years across this country runs as follows: “Let this person first prove with his/her deeds that he/she is capable of changing anything.” The absence of real deeds is the main reproach addressed by the Russian population to all politicians, starting with V. Putin and ending by oppositionists such as S. Udaltsov.

But given today’s conditions in Russia, it is only possible to prove one’s right to leadership with real deeds, if the person holds a top government post with real authority granted. Afterwards, one may establish a party that will support the policy pursued by this leader (here lies the explanation of the initial rise in the rating of the United Russia that was perceived as a party helping Vladimir Putin).

5.2. Dmitry Rogozin

As it follows from the survey results, the attitude to D. Rogozin is rather mixed. Some of the respondents consider him positively and agree with his statements on foreign and defense policy. But many respondents believe that he does nothing in his position, has no clear opinion, is a temporizer not worthy of trust. Focus-group members stressed that Rogozin is pretty good at talking but once again it is mere words that he uses in an attempt to score political points based on nationalism. He has no clear-cut programme of his own and is driven by his own interests. The arms programme that he declares is unrealistic in the version that he suggests, it will eventually destroy the socially important sectors. Opinions are not infrequent that it is hardly possible to consider him as a leader, and some people believe it would be even dangerous.

- *Basically, I don't like Rogozin. Once again, it's just promises. And no real deeds so far (Moscow, man, 31years old, higher education).*
- *Judging by his political career, Rogozin is quite responsive to the alignment of forces in the ruling establishment so in this respect he is a person of no principles (Moscow, man, 56 years old, higher education).*

As it follows from the table, 70% of the respondents know D. Rogozin, or heard something about him, 28% do not know about him. The trust level is 25%. 43% of the respondents do not trust D. Rogozin, 32% found it difficult to answer.

Table 24

| Do you know D. Rogozin? | |
|---------------------------------|----|
| Yes, I do | 41 |
| I've heard something | 29 |
| No, I don't | 28 |
| It's difficult to answer | 2 |
| Do you trust D. Rogozin? | |
| Yes, I do | 16 |
| I rather trust | 9 |
| I rather don't trust | 13 |
| No, I don't | 30 |
| It's difficult to answer | 32 |

5.3. Igor Shuvalov

The recognizability of Igor Shuvalov, despite his senior position – First Vice Premier of the Russian Federation – was very low. Most of the respondents could not say practically anything about him. Those who knew at least any thing about him

would most often call him a functionary, a man who forms part of the Putin’s team, a back-seater who does not discharge key responsibilities in the Government.

- *In my view, Shuvalov is a functionary. He is just a part of the Putin’s team. I can’t see any differences, just one of the ruling people, full stop, he performs some functions in the Government, that’s it (Moscow, woman, 25 years old, higher education).*

The recognizability rating of I. Shuvalov is the lowest out of the three politicians – only 45% of the respondents know him, or heard something about him, more than a half do not know him (54%). Only 15% of the respondents said they trust him, and almost half the respondents do not trust I. Shuvalov (47%) while 38% found it difficult to answer.

The survey results make one suggest that in reality I. Shuvalov may be a good professional, a good appointee but not a self-dependent politician. As they used to say in the 1990s, he is “not electable.”

Table 25

| Do you know I .Shuvalov? | |
|----------------------------------|-----|
| Yes, I do | 24 |
| I’ve heard something | 21 |
| No, I don’t | 54 |
| It’s difficult to answer | 1 |
| Total | 100 |
| Do you trust I. Shuvalov? | |
| Yes, I do | 10 |
| I rather trust | 5 |
| I rather don’t trust | 14 |
| No, I don’t | 33 |
| It’s difficult to answer | 38 |
| Total | 100 |

Conclusion

The new round of CSR’s research testifies to fast and profound changes occurring in the political conscience of the Russian people. These changes confirm that the continuing decline in the trust in the authorities is due to fundamental reasons. It is linked to the increased alienation of the population from the authorities as well as to the demand to renew the authorities as the population can see no real opportunities to achieve this goal.

Deteriorated attitude to Vladimir Putin is expressed not only in an extremely irritated response to his PR campaigns and political rhetoric but also in the fact that in the absence of new positive results his past political merits get quickly forgotten.

The victory in the presidential election held in an environment of descending trend of trust was achieved at the cost of giving rise to exaggerated and inexecutable expectations from the new presidency. The impossibility to implement them has to be paid for now with accelerated fall in trust and further distancing of the people from the authorities.

This frustration extends throughout the whole political arena. There is a perceptible deterioration in the attitude to Dmitry Medvedev, the United Russia as well as to all political parties and political leaders including those of the opposition, and to the electoral system.

The psychological tests have shown that the authorities are perceived antagonistically – as something strong but pursuing personal advantages, acting aggressively, and posing a source of increased danger. At the level of subconscious the respondents consider their relations with the authorities as alienated, distanced and hostile. In the projective psychological tests the respondents describe them as relations typical of wildlife between the predators with which the authorities are associated, and their victims with which the people are associated.

The interference of the Russian Orthodox Church with politics does not only impede the reduction of tensions between the authorities and society but also brings forth new sources of confrontation. According to the projective psychological tests, in respect of its attitude to the Russian Orthodox Church Russian society is split into two unequal antagonistic groups – with an express positive attitude (a majority), and with an acutely negative attitude (a significant minority).

In their perception of the actual policy of the authorities the respondents lay the emphasis on negative aspects. The key items in the negative list score far more votes than the positive list items.

The subconscious image of ideal authorities is extremely different from the reality. Ideal relationships between the people and the authorities are characterized by togetherness, mutual respect and cooperation, which however are based on the people's submission to the authorities. However, the respondents find it difficult to name potential national leaders who are promising in their opinion, and only have a vague idea about the possible action programme of such leaders.

A similar survey conducted among teenagers shows that a new generation is growing in Russia, and with different political mindsets: focus on the competence of the authorities, reduced distance between the authorities and the people, and a demand for horizontal and not vertical systems of interrelations. This generation will join

universities on the eve of the next presidential election, and will be able to exercise certain influence on the course of political events.

Psychological testing has shown that a vast majority of the population suffers from a depressive state that we would identify as «learned helplessness syndrome». The population makes an increasingly more conscientious and rigorous demand for the renewal of the federal, regional and local authorities but is not ready to actively influence the political life neither through participation in the elections, nor through conscientious search of other solutions.

The results of pilot survey of the Daghestani community members revealed major differences in the psychological state of the Russian and Daghestani peoples. The learned helplessness syndrome turned out to be a typical of the Daghestanis, they are characterized by a proactive attitude towards the authorities, and they are subconsciously ready to confront the authorities. These differences correspond quite well to the differences between the electoral campaigns held in October. Unlike in the regions with predominantly Russian population, the results of voting in North Ossetia, Daghestan and Karachaevo-Cherkessia on October 14 were much less unambiguous than before. Opposition leaders and movements took shape there, and they are capable of offering resistance to the candidates of the authorities at elections, and attract a considerable portion of votes to their side.

The elections including the single voting date of October 14, have shown that the population is very sensitive to the defiant lack of prospects to renew the authorities through the election. In their turn, the awareness of lack of prospects and frustrated hopes for a voluntary change of political leaders result in swift increase of the legitimacy of protest-revolutionary scenarios to renew the authorities. For the first time throughout the whole history of our sociological observations, the scenario of renewing the authorities by protest and revolution was discussed in detail and unflinchingly keenly by all of the focus-groups at the initiative of their participants.

Given the sheer political impassiveness of the overwhelming part of population in Russia, the implementation of the protest-revolutionary scenario is not viable under current conditions. However, its rising legitimacy in society increases sensitivity to the potential triggers of mass protests. The new wave of the economic crisis could become one of such triggers.